

SIX YEARS LATER: ASSESSING LONG-TERM THREATS, RISKS AND THE U.S. STRATEGY FOR SECURITY IN A POST-9/11 WORLD

HEARING

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 10, 2007

Serial No. 110-126

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html>
<http://www.oversight.house.gov>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

47-590 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2009

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, *Chairman*

TOM LANTOS, California	TOM DAVIS, Virginia
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York	DAN BURTON, Indiana
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania	CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York	JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland	JOHN L. MICA, Florida
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio	MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois	TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts	CHRIS CANNON, Utah
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri	JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee
DIANE E. WATSON, California	MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts	DARRELL E. ISSA, California
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York	KENNY MARCHANT, Texas
JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky	LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa	PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia	VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota	BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
JIM COOPER, Tennessee	BILL SALI, Idaho
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland	JIM JORDAN, Ohio
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire	
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut	
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland	
PETER WELCH, Vermont	

PHIL SCHILIRO, *Chief of Staff*

PHIL BARNETT, *Staff Director*

EARLEY GREEN, *Chief Clerk*

DAVID MARIN, *Minority Staff Director*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, *Chairman*

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York	CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts	DAN BURTON, Indiana
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York	JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
	TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
DAVE TURK, <i>Staff Director</i>	

CONTENTS

Hearing held on October 10, 2007	Page 1
Statement of:	
Isaacson, Walter, president and CEO, the Aspen Institute; Robert J. Lieber, Ph.D., professor and international relations field Chair, Georgetown University; and Jessica T. Mathews, president, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace	15
Isaacson, Walter	15
Lieber, Robert J.	19
Mathews, Jessica T.	38
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:	
Lieber, Robert J., Ph.D., professor and international relations field Chair, Georgetown University, prepared statement of	23
Mathews, Jessica T., president, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, prepared statement of	42
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of	8
Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State of Massachusetts, prepared statement of	3

SIX YEARS LATER: ASSESSING LONG-TERM THREATS, RISKS AND THE U.S. STRATEGY FOR SECURITY IN A POST-9/11 WORLD

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Higgins, Yarmuth, Braley, McCollum, Cooper, Van Hollen, Hodes, Welch, Shays, Platts, Duncan, Turner, and Foxx.

Staff present: Dave Turk, staff director; Andrew Su and Andy Wright, professional staff members; Davis Hake, clerk; Dan Hamilton, fellow; A. Brooke Bennett, minority counsel; Christopher Bright, minority professional staff member; Nick Palarino, minority senior investigator and policy advisor; and Benjamin Chance, minority clerk.

Mr. TIERNEY. Good morning. A quorum now being present, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs will conduct its hearing entitled, "Six Years Later: Assessing Long-Term Threats, Risks and the U.S. Strategy for Security in a Post-9/11 World."

The meeting will come to order and I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking members of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. Again, without objection, so ordered.

I am going to make a brief opening statement. I am going to submit my remarks for the record and ask unanimous consent that they be included in the record. Without objection, that is so ordered.

This Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs hearing is an attempt to have a series of meetings and witnesses, as esteemed as those before us today, who can come in and discuss our strategy going forward.

Even with the amazing amount of money and energy that has been spent—and lives lost—on military engagements, homeland security, and intelligence since 9/11, there remains somewhat of an inescapable sense that our national security policy may be adrift.

We have rising extremism and gathering terrorist storm clouds; there is a question about whether or not al Qaida will have a resurgence in Pakistan; there are innumerable anti-American attitudes. And more than 6 years after September 11th we still really don't have a bipartisan consensus on a comprehensive long-term strategy to combat the grave threats that exist or to put those threats in context, to assess the priorities and move forward.

In the words of one of our panelists today, we have yet to act with the "burst of creativity" that was the trademark of the United States at the beginning of the cold war.

We have studies that have been commissioned, including the work of the 9/11 Commission; analyses have been offered; strategies have been published. The hard work of formulating and forging and implementing a bipartisan national security strategy, however, still remains lacking. So many people feel that we haven't even yet had a robust bipartisan dialog about that and so, in part, that is what these hearings are about, an attempt to start that dialog and get people's attention focused.

We encourage all the members on the panel, those present and not present yet today, to share their own ideas for future witnesses so that we can have a robust discussion. We want to hear from top experts, people with real-world experiences and innovative, creative ideas. I think our three witnesses today hit those on all points and I think we are going to have a robust discussion.

And there are a number of questions. I won't enumerate all of them right now, but I think in the introductory memo, for members of the panel here, that we had sent a number of those out that we will, no doubt, be exploring with our witnesses here today. We have to determine what is the process for evaluating our performance as we move forward; we have to talk about how our military may be stressed beyond the point that it should; and we should talk a little bit today, hopefully, about the attitude of the rest of the world toward the United States.

The Pew poll, in August 2007, found 68 percent of Pakistanis hold an unfavorable view of the United States; 76 percent of Moroccans have an unfavorable view; 93 percent of Egyptians share that unfavorable view; 64 percent of the people in Turkey, a key NATO ally, believe that the United States poses their greatest foreign policy threat, and a whopping 83 percent have an unfavorable opinion of the United States, up 29 percent since 2002.

Polls obviously aren't the end-all and be-all of how our success should be defined, but it certainly gives us some indication of what is going on with our attempts to win hearts and minds.

So we have serious challenges. We have to use all of the tools in our tool kit, as the 9/11 Commission said. I look forward to the comments that our panel is going to make here today, and I invite Mr. Shays to make his opening remarks before we do hear from the witnesses.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

HENRY A. WAXMAN, CALIFORNIA
CHAIRMAN

TOM DAVIS, VIRGINIA
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
2157 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6143

Majority (202) 225-5051
Minority (202) 225-5074

**Opening Statement of Chairman John F. Tierney at
Oversight Hearing entitled
“Six Years Later: Assessing Long-Term Threats, Risks and the U.S. Strategy for
Security in a Post-9/11 World.”**

October 10, 2007

Today, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs will conduct the first in a series of hearings into long-term U.S. national security strategy six years after 9/11.

Even with the amazing amount of money and energy expended – and more importantly lives lost – so far on military engagements, homeland security and intelligence since September 11, 2001, there remains an inescapable sense that ours is a national security policy adrift...

.... a policy adrift in a sea of rising extremism and gathering terrorist storm clouds, whether from al Qaeda’s resurgence in Pakistan or from anti-American attitudes around the globe.

.... a policy adrift because – more than six years after September 11 – we have still yet to develop a bipartisan consensus on a comprehensive, long-term strategy to combat this grave threat or to put it in the context of other U.S. strategic interests.

In the words of one of our panelists today, we have yet to act with the “burst of creativity” that was the trademark of the United States at the beginning of the Cold War.

While there have been studies commissioned (including the excellent work by the 9/11 Commission), analyses offered and strategies published, the hard work of formulating, forging and implementing a bipartisan national security strategy remains lacking. Many feel that we haven’t even yet had a robust, bipartisan dialogue, one in which the American people are fully engaged.

That is what this series of hearings is about.

As we proceed, I encourage other Members – from both sides of the aisle – to share your own ideas for future witnesses. We want to hear from top experts and those with real-world experiences and innovative, “creative” ideas.

Our three witnesses today hit the mark on all fronts, and I expect a robust discussion. With that in mind, I wish to only lay out a few questions.

For instance, what is the nature of the threat we face? Where does that threat fit into other strategic national interests, such as nonproliferation efforts or relations with Russia and China? What role should the public have in formulating this bipartisan strategy, and what sacrifices will they be asked to make? What role should our allies and international institutions play?

Also, what is the right mix of military power versus other tools at our disposal? The 9/11 Commission concluded, and I quote: “long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy; foreign aid, public diplomacy and homeland defense.” Six years after 9/11, are we achieving the right mix? One expert concluded that the United States is spending 400 times more on hard, coercive power than we do on our soft power to attract. Is this the winning formula?

Finally, what’s the proper standard for evaluating U.S. performance?

The 9/11 Commission noted, and I quote: “our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and prevailing in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism.”

Former Secretary Rumsfeld put it this way: “Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?”

While stretched thin by ongoing engagements, no one questions U.S. military capability and courage to reach and destroy identified targets. But, how are we doing in this broader ideological battle:

- An August 2007 Pew poll found 68% of Pakistanis hold an unfavorable view of the U.S. – up 12% since 2006. In a separate poll, only 4% found any positive motivation whatsoever in the U.S. led war on terror.
- 76% of Moroccans have an unfavorable view of the current U.S. government. 93% of Egyptians share that view – a country that benefits from massive amounts of U.S. aid.
- 64% of people in Turkey – a key NATO ally – believe the U.S. poses their greatest foreign policy threat, and a whopping 83% have an unfavorable opinion of the U.S. – up 29% since 2002.

While polls are not the end-all-be-all of how our success should be defined, they certainly have some relevance about how we are doing in the broader effort to win hearts and minds.

The challenges are certainly immense, but all is not lost. We are the people that led the world to defeat communism and fascism; brought pluralism and religious tolerance to a complex American society; and put human beings on the moon. We focused the economic ingenuity and foreign policy acumen to stabilize and rebuild Europe and Japan after World War II.

At our core, the American people have the heart, fortitude, and imagination to overcome our current challenges. It's past time to get on with it.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I have just tremendous respect for you and the efforts you are making on this committee, and I just want to thank you, first, for conducting this hearing. Also tremendous respect for all three of our witnesses and the institutions they represent.

Having bought about 40 copies of Benjamin Franklin: An American Life and given it to a number of my friends, I just wish I had brought my own copy, Walter, to have you sign it, but I will get back to you on that one.

Mr. ISAACSON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. A great book that gives perspective on a lot of things. I am stunned by the fact that Benjamin Franklin's own son didn't see the light and was a Tory. It was troubled times.

Mr. ISAACSON. Well, we parents understand those thing sometimes.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, the fact that you can understand those times then tells me you understand these times now.

Mr. ISAACSON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Almost 2 years ago, before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the advisory panel to assess domestic response capabilities for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, headed by former Governor Gilmore, concluded the United States lacked a coherent functional national strategy to guide disparate counter-terrorism efforts. In testimony before this subcommittee in March 2001, the Commission's vice chairman, retired Lieutenant General James Clapper, said, "A truly comprehensive national strategy will contain a high level statement of national objectives coupled logically to a statement of the means used to achieve these objectives."

During that same period, the U.S. Commission on National Security Strategy, led by former Senators Hart and Rudman, and the National Commission on Terrorism, headed by former Ambassador Bremer, also concluded that the executive branch required a comprehensive national strategy to counter terrorism.

Mr. Tierney, I really appreciate your holding this hearing and continuing the examination of U.S. national strategies begun by this subcommittee before September 11th.

In January 2001, the Bush administration inherited a loose collection of Presidential directives and law enforcement planning documents that were used as a strategic framework for a national strategy against terrorism, but that fragile construct collapsed with the World Trade Center on September 11th. The brutal nature of the terrorist threat shattered naive assumptions terrorists would be deterred by geographic, political, or moral borders. A new strategic paradigm was needed. Containment, deterrent, reaction, and mutually assured destruction no longer served to protect the fundamental security interests of the American people. In fact, it would be absurd to think it could.

In September 2002, the Bush administration National Security Strategy of the United States of America was published, taking into account the events of September 11th. This strategy was updated in March 2006 and is a fundamental statement of broad administration policy, accompanying many goals, including the need to counter terrorism.

Along with President Bush's first national security strategy came a proliferation of individual strategies to counter terrorism. In March 2003, witnesses told this subcommittee the Bush administration had developed no less than eight high level mission statements on national security: military, strategic, global terrorism, homeland security, weapons of mass destruction, money laundering, cyber security, and critical infrastructure. So by early 2003, what we had was an overarching strategy and a proliferation of individual strategies to counter terrorism.

We held another hearing in March 2004, continuing to examine these national strategies. In the realm of national security, a large number of counter-terrorism strategies does not necessarily mean we are any safer. Only if these strategies guide us toward clearly articulated goals will they help secure our liberty and prosperity against the threats of new and dangerous eras.

So we begin our hearing today using, as a basis, previous examinations of national strategies and asking of the national security strategy of the United States of America has the fundamental characteristics of a coherent strategic framework, one that clearly states a purpose, assesses risk, sets goals, defines needed resources, assigns responsibilities, and integrates implementation. Once this examination is accomplished, we should evaluate the success of all our current counter-terrorism strategies. If the answer to some or all of these questions is no, then we need to change our approach in countering terrorism.

Again, I would like to thank our witnesses and just say that I think the biggest problem is not only the lack of strategies that are clearly understood; there is no debate in Congress, other than what you are doing here, no debate in the public. We look at whether some performers should have control of her child and not have her children taken away; whether Anna Nicole Smith, who was the father of this child. We get into the most absurd debates, at a time when we need to have meaningful dialog. So thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

**Statement of Representative Christopher Shays
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on National Security
and Foreign Affairs
October 10, 2007**

Almost 2 years before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the *Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction*, headed by former Governor Gilmore, concluded the United States lacked a coherent, functional national strategy to guide disparate counterterrorism efforts.

In testimony before this Subcommittee in March 2001, the Commission's vice chairman, retired Lieutenant General James Clapper, said "a truly comprehensive national strategy will contain a high-level statement of national objectives coupled logically to a statement of the means used to achieve these objectives."

During that same period, the *US Commission on National Security Strategy*, led by former Senators Hart and Rudman, and the *National Commission on Terrorism*, headed by former Ambassador Paul Bremer, also concluded that the Executive Branch required a comprehensive national strategy to counter terrorism.

Mr. Tierney, I appreciate you holding this hearing and continuing the examination of US national strategies begun by this Subcommittee before September 11.

In January 2001, the Bush Administration inherited a loose collection of Presidential directives and law enforcement planning documents that were used as a strategic framework for a national strategy against terrorism. But that fragile construct collapsed with the World Trade Center on September 11th. The brutal nature of the terrorist threat shattered naive assumptions terrorists would be deterred by geographic, political or moral borders.

A new strategic paradigm was needed. Containment, deterrence, reaction and mutually assured destruction no longer served to protect the fundamental security interest of the American people.

In September 2002, the Bush administration's *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* was published, taking into account the events of September 11. This strategy was updated in March 2006, and is a fundamental statement of broad administration policy encompassing many goals, including the need to counter terrorism. Along with President Bush's first national security strategy came a proliferation of individual strategies to counter terrorism.

In March 2003, witnesses told this Subcommittee the Bush Administration had developed no less than eight high-level mission statements on national security, military strategy, global terrorism, homeland security, weapons of mass destruction, money laundering, cybersecurity and critical infrastructure. So by early 2003, what we had was an overarching strategy and a proliferation of individual strategies to counter terrorism.

We held another hearing in February 2004, continuing to examine these national strategies. In the realm of national security, a large number of counterterrorism strategies does not necessarily mean we are any safer.

Only if these strategies guide us toward clearly articulated goals will they help secure our liberty and prosperity against the threats of a new and dangerous era.

So we begin our hearing today using as a basis previous examinations of national strategies and asking if *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* has the fundamental characteristics of a coherent strategic framework; one that clearly states a purpose, assesses risk, sets goals, defines needed resources, assigns responsibilities and integrates implementation.

Once this examination is accomplished we should evaluate the success of all of our current counterterrorism strategies.

If the answer to some or all of these questions is no, then we need to change our approach in countering terrorism.

We thank all of our witnesses appearing before us today and I appreciate the fact they made time on their very busy schedules to provide us with their views.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Shays.

We are now going to receive testimony from our excellent panel of witnesses. Let me begin by introducing our panel briefly, because if I went into everybody's credentials, we would be here for the entire hearing.

Walter Isaacson, noted historian, former head of CNN, former editor of Time Magazine, and current president and chief executive officer of the Aspen Institute. A very abbreviated introduction.

Professor Robert Lieber, former State Department consultant, author of 14 books on foreign policy—even reading all the book titles would probably keep us a while—currently professor of—

Mr. LIEBER. I have time.

Mr. TIERNEY. You have time? [Laughter.]

Currently, professor and international relations field Chair at Georgetown University.

Jessica Tuckman Mathews, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, former journalist and columnist, current president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Again, I could go on and on.

Welcome to all of you and thank you. It is the policy of this subcommittee to swear you in before you testify, so, just to keep with policy, I will ask you all to stand and raise your right hands.

Mr. SHAYS. The only one we didn't swear in in 20 years was Senator Byrd. I chickened out. [Laughter.]

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. The witnesses have all answered in the affirmative.

Your full written statements will be put in the hearing record. Dr. Lieber, I say that for yours, because it took me the entire half hour. It was very long and very comprehensive and good on that. So that written statement will be put on the record.

You have 5 minutes. Obviously, we are going to be as liberal with the clock as we can. And I may mention now, I think we will be liberal as people are asking questions, also. If there is no objection, we will go to 10-minute questioning intervals. And except some interventions. If people have a question they want to ask on point of something that is going on, we are going to open that up a little bit and have a discussion here if we can.

So, Mr. Isaacson, please.

STATEMENTS OF WALTER ISAACSON, PRESIDENT AND CEO, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE; ROBERT J. LIEBER, PH.D., PROFESSOR AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FIELD CHAIR, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY; AND JESSICA T. MATHEWS, PRESIDENT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

STATEMENT OF WALTER ISAACSON

Mr. ISAACSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for doing this, Chairman Tierney. It is an honor to be here, and I want to thank Ranking Member Shays for those kind words. Also, last time I testified before Congressman Shays, it was on New Orleans recovery, and you were very open-minded. I appreciate that as well.

I think that is it particularly relevant that it is this committee, because it is one of the few committees with a ranking member and a chairman who I can see can work together in a bipartisan way for important national security and strategic concerns.

I also want to thank the staff. I spent a lot of time with the staff of this committee and they were deeply involved in preparation for this, and I think I learned more from the staff than they learned from me, which is why I was surprised to be invited on this panel.

I am a little intimidated by the other two people on the panel who are great foreign policy intellectuals, and particularly intimidated by Congressman Cooper, who, for those of you who don't know, was at graduate school with me studying international relations, and did much better than I did. And I think he is here because the last time I felt this way was when I saw somebody about to give me an oral exam, and they were sitting up on a podium like that. So I fear that the Congressman from Tennessee has been waiting 30 years to give me an oral exam on what we studied together.

About 60 years ago, the world was faced with a whole new global threat, the threat of the expansion of Soviet communism. And it came upon us rather suddenly. We had just been allies with the Soviet Union in the greatest military victory over fascism and the new president of the United States, Harry Truman, was hit with the fact that, at Yalta and then at Potsdam, and then in the Polish elections, we were faced with another threat that was global in nature and a threat to our very existence and our way of life. And he gathered a group of bipartisan people, called the Wise Men, who worked together with Congress, with Republicans such as Vandenberg and Democrats, in order to create a new national security strategy. That is what I see Chairman Tierney and Congressman Shays and others using this committee to do. It is particularly important because, in this day and age, we are not doing that burst of creativity that we saw in 1947 to 1949.

They were faced with a global threat that came upon them rather suddenly, and what they did was create institutions, that were totally thought up and totally brilliant, to counter the threat that they saw. For example, they created a military alliance, NATO, a brilliant strategy of like-minded nations who were going to contain the threat that they all saw and perceived alike. That NATO military alliance worked very well, but it was part of a context, and that context is what you are trying to do today, which is a clear definition of the threat and, as Congressman Shays said, figure out the purpose, the risks, the goals, the strategies, the tactics, the commitments, and the resources that will be needed for that.

When they did that, they started with the intellectual underpinnings, people like George Kennan, the Jessica Tuckman Mathews of his day. We were able to define why we were in a struggle and who that struggle was against. It was just as controversial as now, trying to figure out who the enemy was. Was it Russia, an expansionist 600 year old Duchy of Muscovy that had become a Russian empire? Was it communism as an ideology? Was it the spread of Soviet communism that was the threat? So with the help of George Kennan and others, they defined the spread of Soviet-backed communism as a clear nature of that threat.

They then went about forming a doctrine for how to counter that threat, known now as the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine was something that was accepted in a bipartisan way by, I think, nine presidents, starting with Harry Truman until the cold war ended with Ronald Reagan and the first President George Bush. They also came to a very clear document, NSC 68, which we every now and then ought to go back and look at, which was a National Security Council document that explained, as Congressman Shays did, exactly the type of military resources, domestic, the risks, the strategies, the tactics you would have to use.

Then they created new institutions like the Marshall Plan, done in such a bipartisan way that when it was invented and being kicked around, Harry Truman thought it was a great idea not to call it the Truman Plan, but to call it the Marshall Plan because it would get bipartisan support, and he said to Robert Lovett, his Under Secretary of State, it means those Republicans won't be able to throw it up against our face, at which point Under Secretary Lovett said, you forget, Mr. President, I am a Republican. And that was in the days when Republicans and Democrats could work together and form a policy and forget which party each one was. We see that on this committee sometimes with the chairman and the ranking member, but we don't see that in this Hill as often as we should.

They created financial institutions because they knew we were trying to win a struggle that was not just a military struggle of who could have enough troops at the Folger Gap to prevent an invasion of Europe, or enough missiles. They knew we had to have an economic in which our side would succeed. So besides the Marshall Plan there was The World Bank, the XM Bank, and other institutions that helped us win a struggle not just for a military might, but for the pocketbooks and loyalties of a new economy.

And it was a combination of realism and idealism. If you ask was the Marshall Plan part of a realist tradition or an idealist tradition, the answer is yes. It served both our national interests and our national values.

Finally, they realized, too, that we had to win the struggle for people's minds. They reinvigorated Voice of America; they created Radio Free Europe; they created all sorts of institutions that were totally creative in order that we would win this struggle and convince people that our values were shared by them.

We have now been hit, on September 11th, with an entire new global struggle. You can debate whether it is as much of a threat as the threat of the spread of Soviet communism, or more of a threat or less, but it is a new type of threat, and we are using the same old institutions, instead of being creative, in order to try to counter it. As much as we may love NATO, it was mainly designed to stop things in the Folger Gap, not designed to win a struggle in the Middle East and other places against the spread of global terrorism.

In fact, we haven't done what, at the very beginning, we should do, and it has been longer since September 11, 2001 than it was between Stalin's decision to cancel the Polish elections and the creation of all the Wise Men's bipartisan policies in the late 1940's. We still haven't even defined the threat very well. You get dis-

agreement; you don't have bipartisan consensus on whether it is radical Islam, whether it is the Islamic Arab world, whether it is terrorism in general that is our threat. It would be nice to define that. It would be nice to define a set of institutions with which we balance commitments and resources and say here is what we need to fight that threat.

What we also should do is try to be just as creative. If we went down a checklist, we could look at, OK, they had the Marshall Plan. What economic programs do we have to win among the moderate Arab world so that we can win the struggle against Islamic fanaticism, as we are struggling to do?

I am involved with the State Department now on U.S.-Palestinian public-private partnerships and investments. I think those are good ideas, but they are no where near the level of the Marshall Plan, the World Bank and the XM Bank that we try to do. I commend the State Department and I look forward to working more on those. I commend the Congress for funding those, but it is not nearly at the level that the people of a previous generation did when they were faced with such a struggle.

And I could go on, but there is only one more point I would make in terms of what they did. In terms of just winning the value struggle. We are sitting here still wondering who is going to run Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. We should be enlisting the people who created Facebook and Google. We should be enlisting people who understand social networking. We should be creating a counterpart to Voice of America that will win the hearts and minds of people around the world.

In 1989, when I was covering the collapse of Soviet communism in Eastern Europe, I remember being in Bratislava, in one of the hotel rooms they put foreign journalists, and it was one of the few hotel rooms that had a satellite dish, which is why they put us there, so we could see the outside world. I was asked by one of the people working in the hotel could they use my hotel room because the students like to come watch music videos in the afternoon. I said, sure, that would be fine. I came back early to meet some of the students. They weren't watching music videos in my room; they were watching CNN and what was happening in the Gdansk Shipyards and what was happening in the rest of Eastern Europe. And I realized that the ability to have a free flow of information was going to be the strongest asset we had in that global struggle.

Likewise, when I went to China a few years ago and was in Kashgar, a tiny village, I walked into a coffee shop and saw four kids behind a computer screen. I asked what they were doing. They spoke Weegar [phonetically]; we were talking through the translator. They said they were on the Internet. I said, well, let me try something. I typed in CNN.com and it was blocked. I typed in Time.com, it said access denied. One of the kids nudged me aside and said, type something in and, boom, there is CNN and there is Time. I said, what did you do? He said, well, we know how to go through proxy servers in Hong Kong that the centers are clueless about.

We should be making use, as our previous generation did, of the new information technologies to win the struggle we have.

When you go back to Benjamin Franklin, somebody I once wrote about, Benjamin Franklin realized that he too faced a great global struggle that he was dealing with in 1776, right after they wrote the Declaration of Independence and he was sent to Paris to get France in on our side in the war. We had to enlist other countries back then, as we do now. And even back then France was a bit of a handful, so they send old Dr. Franklin over there and he carried with him the document they had just written. He and John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were put on the subcommittee to write the document.

With all due respect, it may be the last time Congress created an awesome subcommittee like that. But Jefferson, Adams, and Franklin wrote a declaration explaining why we were in a war of independence, and it was pretty clear what they were doing from the very first sentence, because they said a decent respect for the opinions of mankind is why we are writing this document; we have to bring them in to our side.

And they did a beautiful job writing that document, even and balancing the values we were fighting for, the famous second paragraph that says "We hold these truths." Jefferson writes the first document you can find in the Library of Congress, the first draft said "We hold these truths to be sacred." You see Franklin's printer's pen crossing it out and saying "we hold these truths to be self-evident." And they are trying to explain that it is a new type of value that comes from the consent of the governed and rationality and reason; we are not enshrining the dictates of any particular religion in our new values.

But the sentence goes on, they are "endowed with certain inalienable rights." And there is John Adams' handwriting, "endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights." So even in that sentence they are doing a strategy statement and a value statement in which they are balancing very carefully the role of divine providence, the role of values and religion, the role of a new type of nation that depends on the consent of the governed. And what Benjamin Franklin does when he gets to Paris, besides writing memos to Virjean on the balance of power and why the Bourbon-pact nations have to come in on our side, is he builds a printing press and he prints thousands of copies of that document, which were a public diplomacy document, a propaganda document, saying here is the strategy, here are the values, here is what we are fighting for.

To me, that is what we haven't yet done in this new global struggle and what I hope this committee will, with these hearings, further that process. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. If we have any document, we are going to call it the Shays document, so people won't throw it back in our face. Thank you. [Laughter.]

And you can tell, Doctor, we are going to be liberal with the clock, because every minute of that was worth it, and I suspect the same will be true with the next two witnesses. Doctor, please.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. LIEBER

Mr. LIEBER. Chairman Tierney, Ranking Member Shays, members of the subcommittee, and staff, thank you very much for pro-

viding me with the opportunity to present my views on the crucial subject of long-term threats and risks and U.S. security for the post-9/11 world. You have my testimony, so I am going to concentrate in broad brush terms on what I think are the long-term, even existential, realities of the world in which the United States finds itself not just now, but certainly for the next administration and whichever party occupies the White House.

There are three, I think, realities in the post-9/11 world, and realities which will continue for the foreseeable future. The first of those, and the most important, I think, is that we face a lethal and enduring threat, which is not going to go away and is not chiefly a response to this or that policy or diplomatic action or commitment.

The threat consists, I think, of three distinct but related elements. The first of these is radical Islamist jihadism as an ideology and in its organized forms; the second component is mass casualty terrorism; and the third component is the long-term danger of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons being used potentially by non-state actors, possibly aided by states or even by states themselves.

I would note that the 9/11 Commission itself, which was unanimous and bipartisan in its conclusion in 2004, stated that "The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism, especially al Qaida, the al Qaida network, its affiliates, and its ideology." I would also note that leading experts across party lines have, for the most part, also observed and warned about this.

I could cite numerous studies, but the most recent is in the current issue of *Foreign Policy*, in which more than 100 leading terrorism proliferation and foreign policy experts surveyed by the magazine said, of those 100 experts, more than 80 percent expect a 9/11-scale attack on the United States within the next decade. You can agree or disagree about that educated guess, but it suggests that serious people across party lines draw the same conclusion to which I have pointed.

I also want to indicate that while some see these threats as a result of our policies—good, bad, or otherwise—in Iraq or vis-a-vis Middle Eastern regimes or vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict, I think those assessments miss the deep causes of threat. In my judgment, the threat ultimately is a consequence of the failure of major parts of the Arab Muslim world to cope with the challenges of globalization and modernity. This is more acute in recent decades, but it is a very long-term problem and will take a very long time to sort out. There is also, in longer range terms, looking backward, the sense of humiliation over four centuries of decline for many of those areas of the world. And I think the consequence is that those who are particularly obsessed or upset with it express either individual or societal rage, which again takes its form in radical jihadism, in the use of terrorism, and, I would add, in efforts to inflict mass casualty terrorism.

So my first broad point is that we live and are going to live in an environment of lethal and enduring threat, and this needs to be a priority as we weigh various kinds of tradeoffs and policies.

Second, despite the importance of cooperation with our allies, with international institutions like the United Nations, with the European Union,—and I would add that collaboration is highly desirable and necessary—many of these institutions remain ineffective in confronting the most urgent and deadly threats. In shorthand terms, I would throw out words like Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur as illustrations of that reality.

Third, the United States possesses unique power and capacity, even now. Despite the costs and difficulties of Iraq and Afghanistan, of multiple challenges, of proliferation, rise of regional powers, the growing strength of authoritarian capitalist powers in Russia and China, and our bitter bipartisan or political dis-census in the country; nonetheless, the United States continues to possess remarkable strength and, if you like, primacy. It doesn't mean we can do everything, but it means that the United States has a unique role to play.

In the post-9/11 world, an American grand strategy has emerged; sometimes in official documents, sometimes willy-nilly. In broad brush terms, that grand strategy embodies roughly the following four elements, as, for instance, noted by the administration in its national security documents: one, the maintenance of primary; two, the ability to use preemption, if necessary, in the face of imminent threats; third, multilateral cooperation—I would describe that as as much cooperation with others as possible, but as much unilateral action as unavoidable or necessary—and, finally, support for democracies and democratization.

Now, let me note that citing those four broad points does not necessarily give you a good specific answer to a policy question. Implementation will inevitably be controversial, requiring difficult judgments in the midst of incomplete information and uncertainty. In the judgment of history, inept or imprudent choices can be harsh. But I would also disagree with descriptions that suggest a radical departure from past American history. In response to attacks on the United States and looking back at Harry Truman and the Truman Doctrine, which Mr. Isaacson has rightly referred to, and looking back at the Kennedy inaugural of 1961, at Reagan's State of the Union in 1985, I would note there is a bipartisan legacy on which a good deal of contemporary grand strategy builds, even if there is ample debate about implementation, policy decisions, and even prudence.

There are problems, obviously. The United States has the capacity to act and lead, but it requires all kinds of things to be effective over the long term: an appropriate fiscal and monetary environment; social cohesion and public support; policy management and coordination of the sort that this committee is seeking to focus on; skilled diplomacy. I come from Georgetown University, and there is a saying about diplomacy, that skilled diplomacy is the ability to tell someone to go to hell in such a way that he looks forward to the trip. I would submit that our diplomacy has not always had that exquisite degree of skill and finesse.

Cooperation with others to the maximum extent possible, but not beyond that extent; and we also encounter certain deficits now. Our military is stretched, our public diplomacy is a disaster, a legacy both of the fateful Clinton era decision to do away with USIA and

the inability of the current administration to really turn that around. We need a new USIA or its equivalent. I think that is an urgent matter.

We also have an utterly dysfunctional visa system which tends to discourage or shut out the kinds of people with the skills, commitment, and backgrounds that we need, while willy-nilly tending to give, sometimes by the back door, avenues for those who are less appropriate.

Importantly, we still lack an urgently needed energy policy. Our energy policy over a couple of decades has been disastrous. It represents a threat to our economy and our national security in terms of the necessity of ratcheting down our dependence on oil. It can't be completely eliminated, but our current policy strengthens our adversaries and plenty of others.

We can cope. America has, despite obstacles, in the past, overcome huge challenges: World War II, creating the Marshall Plan, the Apollo mission, and so on, not least because of our attributes of flexibility and adaptability.

Let me conclude. The United States faces lethal and persistent threats. Neither the United Nations nor any other international organization is capable of effective action without important use of state power. Multilateral responses to common threats, for example, proliferation, can be effective and necessary, but they are hard to achieve. The U.S. role and U.S. power are unique. The crux is to use that power skillfully and prudently, but not to assume there is a real alternative to it. Whoever takes the oath of office on January 20, 2009, will need to adopt a national security strategy that incorporates key elements of the post-9/11 foreign policy doctrine. America's own national security and the maintenance of a decent international order depend on it.

Thank you for listening.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lieber follows:]

Written Testimony of

Robert J. Lieber
Professor of Government & International Affairs
Department of government
Georgetown University
Washington, DC 20057-1034
lieberr@georgetown.edu

Submitted to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
Oversight and Government Reform Committee
U.S. House of representatives

October 10, 2007

Chairman Tierney, Ranking Member Shays, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you very much for providing me with the opportunity to present my views on the vitally important subject of assessing long-term threats and risks and on U.S. strategy for security in a post-9/11 world.

Six years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States continues to possess a unique degree of power and to play an indispensable role in world affairs. Now, however, in the face of difficult and ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and an array of seemingly intractable problems, many authors and strategists are predicting the end of an era of superpower predominance and the need for major, even radical change in grand strategy. They argue that America's size and predominance, as well as its foreign policy conduct, the war in Iraq, and our economic, structural and military vulnerabilities, are triggering the emergence of an increasing number and variety of challenges to U.S. power and influence.

Nonetheless, counterbalancing and the decline of American primacy have yet to take place and it remains a matter of contention whether or when these may occur. Elsewhere, I have argued that the threat from militant Islamic terrorism, the weakness of international institutions in confronting the most urgent and deadly problems, and the unique role of the United States have made a grand strategy of superpower preeminence a logical and necessary adaptation to the realities of the post-9/11 world.¹

This leads, however, to the question of whether we may be witnessing a major erosion of America's capacity to play such a role. One source of change could come from shifts in the international distribution of power, so that other states, individually or in coalition, acquire power that equals or even exceeds that of America. In addition, there are the human and material costs of a long and difficult war in Iraq and an ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan which together may be undercutting America's strength. At the same time, the U.S. faces current or potential threats from regional and lesser powers as well as radical Islamist terrorist groups, and more diffuse but no less real dangers from nuclear proliferation and failed states. And the rise of the authoritarian capitalist powers, Russia and China, suggests the possible re-emergence of great power competitors.²

Threats to primacy can come from many different directions, not only from abroad. A significant yet often under-emphasized dimension concerns the maintenance of a strong domestic

¹ *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005 and revised edition 2007.) The above testimony is drawn in abbreviated and revised form from Robert J. Lieber, "Persistent Primacy and the Future of the American Era," paper delivered at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, August 30th-September 2nd, 2007.

² See Azar Gat, "The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July/August 2007): 59-69.

foundation. There are long-term economic challenges in funding a robust national security strategy and meeting the needs of an aging population while maintaining economic growth and financial stability, especially in the context of serious domestic dissensus and political polarization more pronounced than at any time since the Vietnam era.

Here, in addressing the question of whether the American role is sustainable, I briefly review external threats and possible alternatives to the American role. I then examine past and present doctrine and policy and argue that both have sometimes been mischaracterized in debates about strategy and foreign policy. Next I address the problems of domestic capacity. Without minimizing the very real difficulties in both the international and domestic environments, I conclude that the underpinnings of American primacy remain relatively robust. No effective alternative to the American role exists, and the lethal perils that became apparent on 9/11 will not disappear anytime soon. Indeed, whoever takes the presidential oath of office on January 20, 2009 will need to adopt a national security strategy that incorporates key elements of current foreign policy doctrine. This is not only in America's own national security interest, but essential for sustaining a stable and liberal international order.

I. The International Context

Threats. Contrary to widely expressed hopes and expectations following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, a lethal and sustained threat to America's security and vital interests has emerged. This consists of three distinct but interrelated elements: first, radical Islamist jihadism as ideology and in its varied organizational forms; second, the systematic and widespread use of mass casualty terrorism; and third, the longer term peril that non-state actors may eventually acquire and use some form of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weaponry (CBRN).

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington were a watershed event and deserve comparison with Pearl Harbor in marking the start of a great conflict, but the peril had been developing during the course of the 1990s. For example, a 1995 plot, the abortive Bojinka Plan, would have destroyed 10 to 12 wide body passenger aircraft over the Pacific.³ Even earlier, the 1993 truck bomb attack on the World Trade Center in New York only narrowly failed in its aim.

Abroad, particularly in parts of Europe, there has been a tendency to view 9/11 and radical Jihadism through the lenses of earlier and more familiar experiences with violent domestic groups such as Baader-Meinhof in Germany, the red brigades in Italy, the IRA in Northern Ireland, and the Basque separatist ETA in Spain, and to imagine that the danger can be treated primarily as a

³ See Phillip A. Karber, "Re-Constructing Global Aviation in the Era of the Civilian Aircraft as a Weapon of Destruction," *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy*, vol. 25, no. 2, (Spring 2003): p. 789; and *Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001*, (Washington, DC: 107th Congress, 2nd Session, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, H. Rept. no. 107-792, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, S. Rept. no. 107-351, December 2002) pp. 129, 192.

criminal matter best dealt with by domestic security, policing and courts. Unfortunately, the scale of threat can not be understood in such limited terms, and though partially obscured by sharp differences about the Iraq War.

European governments do appear to have become increasingly aware of the danger. The head of Britain's MI5 revealed in November 2006 that as many as 30 "mass casualty" terrorist plots had been identified and that British security services and police were monitoring 200 groups or networks totaling more than 1600 persons "actively engaged in plotting or facilitating terrorist attacks."⁴ Among more recent events, there were failed bomb attacks in central London and at Glasgow airport in June 2007, and in early September German police seized three Islamist terrorists planning massive bombings against targets in Germany. Moreover, Osama bin Laden, who has been preaching war against the United States since at least 1996, has asserted that acquisition of nuclear weapons is a sacred duty and added that al-Qaeda would be justified in killing four million Americans, half of them children. In recognition of this threat, the bipartisan 9/11 Commission stated in its unanimous report that, "[T]he catastrophic threat at this moment in history is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism – especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology."⁵

It is also the judgment of prominent and largely non-partisan authorities on terrorism and proliferation that the use of CBRN may well occur within the next decade. For example, Robert L. Gallucci has written that, "[U]nless many changes are made, it is more likely than not that al Qaeda or one of its affiliates will detonate a nuclear weapon in a U.S. city within the next five to ten years."⁶ In addition, a survey of 100 foreign policy experts by *Foreign Policy* magazine and the Center for American Progress found that, "More than 80 percent expect a terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11 within a decade...."⁷ Similarly, there are the responses of 85 national security and non-proliferation experts to a survey conducted by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff for its then Chairman, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, and published in June 2005. These respondents were asked to predict the likelihood of a CBRN attack occurring anywhere in the world within the following ten years and their average probability estimate was 29% for a nuclear attack, 40% for a radiological attack and 70% for some kind of CBRN event.⁸

⁴ Dame Eliza Manningham-Butler, cited in Lee Glendinning, *The Independent*, November 10, 2006.

⁵ *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (NY: W.W. Norton, 2004), p. 362.

⁶ Robert L. Gallucci, "Avoiding Nuclear Catastrophe," *Vulnerability*, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, No. 607 (September 2006): 51-58 at 52.

⁷ "The Terrorism Index," *Foreign Policy* (No. 162, September/October, 2007), p. 62.

⁸ Lugar Survey on Nuclear Proliferation, June 2005, text at: <http://lugar.senate.gov/reports/NPSurvey.pdf>.

Another reason for concluding that the threat is deep-seated and long term has to do with the fundamental underlying sources of radical Islamism. Those who downplay the threat tend to argue that the most important causes stem from specific provocations by America, Israel or the West, particularly the Iraq War, the American presence in the Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the affront caused by “occupation” of Arab or Muslim lands.⁹ Such interpretations not only do not take into account the far deeper origins of radical Islam, but they also tend to oversimplify the explanation of contemporary conflicts.¹⁰

The deep causes of radical jihadism and its manifestations of apocalyptic nihilism lie in the failure to cope successfully with the challenges of modernity and globalization and in the humiliation experienced, especially by parts of the Arab-Muslim world, over the past four centuries. These reactions have been expressed at both individual and societal levels. For example, in an implied reference to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and thus the end of the Muslim Caliphate which had extended back some thirteen centuries to the time of the Prophet, Osama bin Laden’s October 2001 video invoked eighty years of Muslim “humiliation” and “degradation” at the hands of the West.¹¹ In turn, the 2002 UN Arab Human Development Report has described the contemporary Arab world as afflicted by profound deficits in freedom, in empowerment of women, and in knowledge and information. These failures have, in some cases, been amplified by the experiences of individuals who have become detached from one world and yet have been unable to integrate into another.¹²

It is noteworthy too that the 9/11 attacks took place prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and that terrorist attacks against American targets abroad were carried out in 1990s when the Israel-Arab peace process seemed to be making real progress. Suicide terrorism elsewhere has had little to do with “occupation” by the West or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Attacks in Bali, Istanbul, Jakarta, Tunisia, Casablanca, Amman, the murder of the Dutch film-maker Theo Van Gogh, the effort to blow up the Indian parliament, the destruction of the Shiite golden dome

⁹ Cf. the interpretation of Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic logic of Suicide Terrorism* (NY: Random, 2005).

¹⁰ In contrast, Assaf Moghadam has provided a compelling refutation of the idea that suicide terrorism is primarily motivated by a resistance to “occupation,” and he emphasizes the way in which it has evolved into a “globalization of martyrdom.” See “Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Volume 29, Number 8 (December 2006).

¹¹ Text of bin Laden Remarks. “Hypocrisy Rears Its Ugly Head,” as broadcast by Al-Jazeera television on October 7, 2001. *Washington Post*, October 8, 2001.

¹² See especially Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong?: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), and Fouad Ajami, *The Foreigner’s Gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq* (NY: Free Press, 2006).

mosque in Samarra, deadly Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq, mass casualty attacks on public transportation in London and trains in Madrid, and numerous interrupted plots are among multiple indications not only of the wider threat posed by radical jihadism, but of a deep-seated and fundamental rage against modernity and those identified with it.

In addition to the threat posed by radical Islamist ideology and terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is likely to become an increasingly dangerous source of instability and conflict. Over the longer term, and coupled with the spread of missile technology, the U.S. will be more exposed to this danger. Not only might the technology, materials or weapons themselves be diverted into the hand of terrorist groups willing to pay almost any price to acquire them, but the spread of these weapons carries with it the possibility of devastating regional wars.

In assessing nuclear proliferation risks in the late-Saddam Hussein's Iraq, in North Korea, and in Iran, some have asserted that deterrence and containment, which seemed to work during the Cold War, will be sufficient to protect the national interests of the U.S. and those of close allies.¹³ Such views are altogether too complacent. The U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance took two decades to become relatively stable and on at least one occasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, the parties came to the nuclear brink. Moreover, stable deterrence necessitates assured second strike capability, the knowledge that whichever side suffered an initial nuclear attack would have the capacity to retaliate by inflicting unacceptable damage upon the attacker. It also requires that one's adversary is a value-maximizing rational actor.

A robust nuclear balance is difficult to achieve, and in the process of developing a nuclear arsenal, a country embroiled in an intense regional crisis may become the target of a disarming first strike or, on the other hand, may perceive itself to be in a use-it-or-lose-it situation. Moreover, even though American territory may be at less risk within the next few years, its interests, bases and allies surely are. And decision-making control by rational actors in new or pending members of the nuclear club is by no means a foregone conclusion. For example, Iranian President Ahmadinejad has expressed beliefs that suggest an erratic grip on reality or that call into question his judgment, he has invoked the return of the twelfth or hidden Imam, embraced conspiracy theories about 9/11, fostered Holocaust denial, and called for Israel to be wiped off the map.

One more component of threat to the global liberal democratic order concerns what Azar Gat has termed the rise of authoritarian capitalist powers.¹⁴ In his view, radical Islam, is actually a lesser threat in that it fails to offer a viable alternative to modernity, though he does take seriously the potential use of WMD, especially by terrorist groups. However, Gat argues that the more

¹³ Cf. Ian Shapiro, *Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); also John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "An Unnecessary War," *Foreign Policy*, No. 134, January/February 2003: 50-59.

¹⁴ Azar Gat, "The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July/August 2007): 59-69, at 59-60.

dangerous challenge stems from the rise of China and Russia, both of which represent an alternative path to modernity. He concludes, that while either country could eventually evolve in a more democratic direction, the United States continues to be the key actor for the future of liberal democracy.

Alternatives. Almost every deliberation about foreign policy sooner or later gives rise to calls for renewed or enhanced reliance on international institutions and multilateralism as preferred means for addressing common problems and threats. The emergence and expansion of international norms and regimes is seen as evidence of a growing degree of global governance. For some, authorization by the United Nations Security Council has come to be regarded as the litmus test for the legitimacy of any foreign intervention. The UN specialized agencies are pointed to, and global, functional or regional bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA), World Trade Organization and the European Union are praised for their roles above and beyond the nation state.

Of course, international law does operate in certain realms (for example Law of the Sea), and traditional national sovereignty has eroded under pressure from the forces of modernity and globalization. This is especially true for smaller and medium sized countries and for rules and practices involving trade, finance, investment, intellectual property, air travel, shipping and sports, as well as for international tribunals to punish a select number of gross human rights violators from conflicts in places such Bosnia, Rwanda, and Liberia.

Shared understandings and rules of the road are often important. But by no means do all societies accept the norms of liberal democracy, transparency and the rule of law. Moreover, even shared norms and beliefs can sometimes be flawed. Why, for example, is a decision to act against threats to the peace more legitimate when it is validated by the representatives of authoritarian regimes in Moscow and Beijing than when merely agreed to by the elected leaders of liberal democracies? In crisis situations the invocation of global governance, international norms, or treaty obligations is as much or more likely to be a pretext for inaction rather than a spur to compliance. And the more urgent, dangerous or deadly the peril, the less likely there is to be effective agreement by the international community. Consider a number of cases in point:

- Bosnia, from 1992 to 1995, where UN resolutions and peacekeepers proved unable to halt the carnage or to rein in Serbia, and where UN peacekeepers stood by impotently during the July 1995 Srebrenica massacre.
- The Rwanda genocide of 1994, where the UN Security Council permanent members consciously averted their gaze and deliberately reduced the small UN troop presence.
- Iraq under Saddam Hussein, which from 1991 to 2002 failed to comply with its obligations in successive UNSC resolutions passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
- Syria and Hezbollah, which have repeatedly defied Security Council resolutions concerning Lebanese sovereignty and the disarming of militias.
- North Korea, which has – at least until very recently – systematically, secretly, and sometimes openly, flouted both IAEA and UN resolutions as well as its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).

- Iran, whose concealed nuclear program violated NPT and IAEA requirements for more than eighteen years, as well as recent Security Council resolutions, and whose Revolutionary Guards have repeatedly intervened covertly in Lebanon and Iraq, and have carried out terrorist bombings as far afield as Argentina.

- Sudan, whose depredations in the Darfur region have caused as many as 400,000 deaths and the flight of some two million refugees, and which has managed (with Chinese help) to minimize effective international intervention;

- Russia, which has used both overt and covert means to intimidate or coerce independent states of the former Soviet Union by such means as arming separatist groups, refusing to withdraw its troops and bases, and manipulating energy supplies.

Not all of these cases are threats to America's national security, interest or allies, but they illustrate the limitations of the UN and mechanisms of global governance. At times, it has been possible to work with allies in responding effectively to crises. An instructive case was the 1999 agreement of NATO member states to intervene in Kosovo in order to halt ethnic cleansing and mass murder. This took place after it had become clear that Russia would veto any UN Security Council authorization to act against Serbia. Many, though not all, international law experts saw the intervention as lacking international legitimation, but the American-led air war against Serbian forces in Kosovo and targets within Serbia itself ultimately did bring ethnic cleansing to a halt. The NATO intervention, however, exhibited key limitations. The great majority of the air sorties were conducted by the Americans, with some participation by the British and to a limited extent others (French, Italian, etc.), but most of the NATO contingents lacked the advanced military technology and force deployments to be able to cooperate effectively with the U.S. Air Force.

Shifts in the International Distribution of Power Despite expectations that a period of unipolarity would trigger balancing behavior or that French-German-Russian opposition to the American-led intervention in Iraq would stimulate the formation of such a coalition, effective balancing against the United States has yet to occur, and principal European leaders have either maintained (as in the case of Britain) or reasserted (Germany and France) pragmatic Atlanticist policies. And for its part, the European Union has not distanced itself from the United States let alone emerged as a strategic competitor. There are good reasons for this long-term continuity, including shared interests and values as well as the inability of the EU member countries to create a military with sufficient funding, advanced military technology, power projection and the unity of command that could enable it to play the kind of role in security that its size, population and wealth would otherwise dictate.

Other major powers have actually tightened their bonds with Washington. India and Japan have developed closer ties with the United States than at any time in the past. Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, Canada and others have also leaned more toward than away from America. Despite a significant rise in expressions of anti-Americanism as indicated in opinion polls, it would be a mistake to assume that the world has turned against the United States.

As for the leading authoritarian capitalist powers, Russia under Putin has adopted a much more critical and assertive stance, but well short of outright confrontation; and China, despite its

booming economy and rapidly modernizing armed forces, has yet to take an overtly antagonistic position toward the U.S.

Thus while a major balancing coalition against the United States has not taken shape, formidable challenges will face whoever becomes the next president on January 20, 2009. Moscow and Beijing have not formed an alliance against Washington, but both have acted to support regional states that pose significant problems for the U.S. For example, Russia has sold advanced anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran and Syria, and neither Russia nor China is likely to accede to Western urging for truly effective measures against Iran's nuclear program or Sudan's depredations in Darfur.

Power itself by no means guarantees the achievement of desired outcomes. Nuclear proliferation constitutes a severe and growing menace. Iran, Venezuela, and Syria have proved difficult to influence or coerce. The war in Afghanistan has no end in sight, and the willingness and ability of NATO allies to provide sufficient numbers of effective troops remains limited. American forces are fully stretched in Iraq where stability remains an elusive goal. Al-Qaeda has reestablished itself in the tribal areas of Western Pakistan and the adjacent border regions of Afghanistan. And the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolvable in the absence of a Palestinian leadership with the capacity to act on behalf of its population and the will to end terrorism and to work toward a two-state solution and a durable peace.

In sum, the international environment in which the United States finds itself is one in which there are both stubborn and lethal threats. Multilateral and international mechanisms for responding to these perils can be effective, but they are difficult to achieve. Meanwhile, in the absence of an effective counterbalance, America maintains a position of primacy. The extent to which it can continue to do so is, however, as much or more dependent on internal and domestic considerations as it is on the difficulties it faces abroad.

II. Domestic Considerations: Doctrine and Policy

American national security policy since the end of the Cold War, and especially since 9/11 has often been characterized as an aberration, either because it takes place without the restraint required by adaptation to bipolarity during the Cold War, or because it is said to have abandoned past multilateral practice in order to act unilaterally. But these depictions do not serve well as explanations of past and present doctrine or policy. As John Lewis Gaddis and others have noted, the United States has characteristically reacted to being attacked by adopting strategies of primacy and preemption. Its neighbors in the 18th and 19th Century found the United States a "dangerous nation."¹⁵ And since World War II, presidents of both parties have invoked a sense of mission in describing America's international role, in ways that go well beyond the kind of limited engagement that some critics insist is a more consistent or desirable strategy.

President Harry Truman, for example, in his March 1947 speech to a joint session of congress setting out what became known as the Truman Doctrine, asserted that "it must be the

¹⁵ See Robert Kagan, *Dangerous Nation* (NY: Knopf, 2006).

policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” John Kennedy’s 1961 inaugural address proclaimed that “we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” Ronald Reagan’s State of the Union address in February 1985 insisted, that “We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives--on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua--to defy Soviet aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth. Support for freedom fighters is self-defense.” Bill Clinton’s 1993 inaugural address asserted that “Our hopes, our hearts, our hands, are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America’s cause.” And in July 1994, his *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* advocated expanding the community of democracies and market economies. In view of these precedents, the Bush administration’s embrace of both democratization and primacy in its 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) and in the second inaugural address of January 2005, are not inconsistent with past rhetorical statements of American doctrine.¹⁶

It is also commonplace to assert that, prior to 9/11, American foreign policy had been multilateral in character, built upon Republican built international institutions, alliances, and acceptance of “self-binding” in order to secure common objectives.¹⁷ But the record of the past six decades is more varied than a neat bifurcation between the multilateral past and the unilateral present would imply. Harry Truman sent American forces to Korea in 1950 without awaiting UN authorization, President Dwight Eisenhower ordered U.S. troops to Lebanon in 1958, John F. Kennedy appeared ready to launch a preemptive attack on Soviet missiles in Cuba had the Russians not backed down during the October 1962 missile crisis, Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford sent American troops to Indochina. Ronald Reagan invaded Grenada and George H. W. Bush intervened in Panama. The elder Bush also worked closely with Chancellor Helmut Kohl to achieve German unification despite the reservations of Britain, France and Russia, and President Clinton used Tomahawk missiles and combat aircraft to strike targets in Afghanistan and Iraq and launched the 1999 air war in Kosovo with NATO agreement but without the formal approval of the UN Security Council.

Other evidence of policy continuity can be found in the more or less bipartisan character of decisions to intervene with military force during the period between 1989 and 2001. Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan observe that of eight such interventions during those years, four were carried out by Democratic administrations and four by Republicans. They add that the circumstances in which a president may need to use force have increased since 9/11, these now include terrorism threats, weapons proliferation, prevention of genocide, as well as in response to traditional forms of aggression. At the same time, they do advocate a policy of seeking consensus among

¹⁶ Robert Kagan makes this point in “End of Dreams, Return of History,” *Policy Review*, August/September, 2007.

¹⁷ John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); and “The End of the Neoconservative Movement,” *Survival*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Spring 2004): 7-22.

democratic states as a way of securing domestic consensus for the use of force.¹⁸

III. Domestic Capacity

Can the United States sustain the financial costs of its global role and national security strategy? The answers are not simple. Viewed historically the burden of defense spending as a percentage of GDP seem manageable. Despite the enormous burdens of the Iraq and Afghan wars, America now spends approximately 4.2% of GDP on defense. This contrasts with figures of 6.6% at the height of the Reagan buildup in the mid-1980s, and up to 10% and more during the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy years. There are, however, important differences, which make the financial problem potentially more difficult than it might seem. In all likelihood, defense budget costs will increase even after a drawdown of troops in Iraq begins. The price tag for replacing worn out or obsolete equipment will be enormous, expensive new weapons systems remain to be funded, and leading figures in both parties have called for increasing the size of the Army and Marine Corps. A volunteer army is much more costly than one based on the draft, which was phased out in 1971. Meanwhile, the pending retirement of the baby boom generation, looming deficits in the Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid budgets, and a gradually aging population all make this task significantly more difficult.

The problem of costs is not merely one of numbers. Aaron Friedberg emphasizes the long term challenge of bringing means and ends into alignment. He observes that this will be a daunting task, especially in view of the fact that since the early 1960s, the government has been without a mechanism for sustained interagency planning and for bringing the conflicting demands of finance and strategy into some kind of long term balance.¹⁹ In addition, in an intensely partisan domestic climate, reaching bipartisan consensus on high-stakes issues has become exceptionally difficult.

Others have argued that this polarization along with bitter divisions about Iraq and the war on terror threaten to erode America's ability to sustain its international role, and they argue for a scaling back of foreign commitments in order to stabilize the political foundations for foreign policy.²⁰ However, it is not self-evident that a less engaged foreign policy and reduced commitments are really what matter most. Political dissensus, the war in Iraq, and public judgments about whether foreign interventions will succeed or fail matter more than the scale of intervention itself. Over-extension is to be avoided, but domestic support is a *sine qua non* for sustainable foreign policy commitments, and there is a tendency to assume that public reluctance

¹⁸ Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan, "The Next Intervention," *Washington Post*, August 6, 2007; also "America and the Use of Force: Sources of Legitimacy," (Muscatine Iowa: The Stanley Foundation, June 2007).

¹⁹ Aaron Friedberg, "The Long Haul: Fighting and Funding America's Next Wars," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 4, July/August 2007.

²⁰ E.g., Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz, "Grand Strategy for a Divided America," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 4, July/August 2007.

to bear the costs of foreign interventions is a function of increasing casualties. However, public tolerance for the human costs of war is mainly affected by beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of the war and especially by the likelihood of success.²¹

In addition, there is the problem of institutional capacity to manage, coordinate and execute national security policy in its multiple dimensions. Not only foreign policy and military spending, but force deployments, political and military commitments, intelligence, counter-terrorism, public diplomacy, foreign broadcasting, trade policy, and economic sanctions are among the elements that require coordination and skilled implementation.²² Recent experience provides cause for concern. Shortcomings in intelligence coordination before and after 9/11, the occupation of Iraq, public diplomacy, immigration policy and a dysfunctional visa system, failure to take more effective steps to reduce oil consumption and imports, and inadequate local, state and national response to the Katrina hurricane provide evidence that governmental capacity to manage large scale challenges is often badly flawed. Yet 20th Century American history includes massive undertakings which were carried out successfully, for example mobilization of manpower and industry in World War II, the Manhattan Project, the Marshall Plan, the interstate highway program of the 1950s and 1960s, the Apollo project to put a man on the moon, and successful waging of the Cold War. These precedents offer no assurance about future successes, but they provide evidence that government can develop the capacity for effective response and at times even do so with speed and efficiency.

The intangible yet indispensable element of domestic capacity is public support and the social cohesion necessary for sustaining national power and strategy. As noted above, the expectation of eventual success is critical. So too are the political skills, and leadership capacity of any administration as well as its diplomatic adroitness in gaining support from other countries, not least to enhance the perceived legitimacy of an intervention. Here, cooperation with the European democracies becomes especially important in ways that go well beyond burden sharing because it reinforces the perceived validity of the action being taken.

There is one additional and often insufficiently appreciated element, the urgency of external threat. During six decades, from Pearl Harbor to the end of the Cold War, the United States faced successive and profound threats to its national security and vital interests, first from Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, and then after a brief interlude from the Soviet Union. The substantial domestic consensus about these threats, shared by the public, foreign policy elites and decision makers, political parties and the media provided a solid domestic basis for a robust national security strategy. This did not preclude domestic dissent and disagreement, let alone insure unanimity of views, for example in regard to the Vietnam War, but it did provide a basis for coherent and effective state action in mustering the needed resources and maintaining sufficient public support.

²¹ Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq," *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Winter 2005/06): 7-46, at 8.

²² Dennis Ross makes this point in *Statecraft and How to Restore America's Standing in the World* (NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007.)

The post-Cold War era (1991-2001), provided a contrast. In the absence of consensus about the existence of a profound overall threat, the salience of foreign policy dropped quite noticeably. Election exit polls during the 1990s found only single digit percentages of voters identifying foreign or security policy as among the leading concerns shaping their votes. Television and newspaper treatment of foreign affairs also plummeted. Together, these factors contributed to a weakening of the Clinton administration's ability to muster public and congressional support for foreign policy.

Post-9/11, these circumstances changed dramatically, but the passage of time, partisan acrimony, disillusionment with the Iraq war, and the absence of another mass casualty attack on the homeland have eroded both the sense of threat and any consensus about strategy. That leaves a major uncertainty in any attempt to gauge the future domestic policy environment. In view of the sustained nature of external threat described above, the possibility of a future mass casualty attack within the United States remains significant, even though its probability is a matter of educated guessing. Were such an attack to occur, it is likely that there would be a domestic resurgence of support for a very robust, even draconian, response and for paying whatever price was required in the effort to prevail against lethal adversaries. Conversely, in the absence of another such attack, domestic support for an interventionist foreign policy would be more likely to be contested.

IV. Challenges and Challengers

Can American primacy be sustained? Threats from radical Islamist groups, nuclear proliferation, the potential use of CBRN weapons, and competition from authoritarian capitalist powers pose challenges that require assertive American engagement. In addition, democratic allies and others have shown few signs of wanting to forego the involvement of the North American "Goliath,"²³ and despite heated rhetoric about real or imagined excesses of unilateralism, multilateral cooperation has continued to take place. The National Security Strategy of September 2002 included a much overlooked endorsement of multilateralism and in recent years there have been six-party talks with North Korea, deference to Germany, Britain and France (the EU-3) in their unsuccessful negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, promotion of the multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative aimed at strengthening the NPT, co-sponsorship with France of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 calling for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, an increase in funding to combat AIDS in Africa, an expanded NATO role in Afghanistan, and even a UN mandate – UNSC Resolutions 1546 (2004) and 1637 (2005) – for the U.S. led multinational force in Iraq.

Effective alternatives to the role played by the United States are inadequate or absent altogether, and neither the United Nations, nor other international bodies such as the European Union, the African Union, the Arab league or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations offer an effective substitute. As Robert Kagan has observed, "American predominance does not stand in

²³ Michael Mandelbaum makes good use of this metaphor in *The Case for Goliath* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005).

the way of progress toward a better world....It stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world."²⁴ In short, on the demand side, there is ample need for America's active engagement.

What then about the supply side? The domestic costs and complications are evident but need to be weighed in context. The long-term reality of external threats creates a motivation for engagement abroad, as does the possibility of future attacks at home. Despite a heated domestic political climate, none of the leading presidential candidates of either party have called for dramatic retrenchment, and while disagreeing sharply about Iraq and the foreign policy of the Bush administration, they tend to concur on the need to increase the size of the armed forces. Unlike the Vietnam era, popular support for the troops is widespread, even among many critics of the Iraq war.

Constraints on the capacity of adversaries also need to be taken into account. Russia under Putin has put pressure on its immediate neighbors and seeks to rebuild its armed forces, but Moscow's ability to regain the superpower status of the former Soviet Union remains limited. The Russian armed forces are in woeful condition, the total population is half that of the USSR and declining by 700,000 per year, the economy is overwhelmingly dependent on revenues from oil and natural gas and thus vulnerable if world market prices soften, and the long term stability of its crony capitalism and increasingly authoritarian political system are uncertain. China, despite extraordinary economic growth and modernization, will continue to depend on rapid expansion of trade and the absorption of vast numbers of people moving from the countryside to the cities. It may well become a major military challenger of the United States, first regionally and even globally, but only over the long term.

Demography also works to the advantage of the United States. Most other powerful states, including China and Russia as well as Germany and Japan, face the significant aging of their populations. Although the U.S. will need to finance the costs of an aging population, this demographic shift is occurring to a lesser extent and more slowly than among its competitors, and these changes in global aging will facilitate the continuation of American economic and military power.²⁵

Finally, the United States benefits from two other unique attributes, flexibility and adaptability. Time and again, America has faced daunting challenges and made mistakes, yet it has possessed the inventiveness and societal flexibility to adjust and respond successfully. Despite obvious problems, there is reason to believe that the country's adaptive capacity will allow it to respond to future requirements and threats. None of this assures the maintenance of its world role, but the domestic underpinnings to support this engagement remain relatively robust.

²⁴ Robert Kagan, "End of Dreams, Return of History," *Policy Review*, August/September, 2007.

²⁵ Mark L. Haas, "A Geriatric Peace? The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations," *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Summer 2007): 112-147, at 113.

Thus for the foreseeable future, U.S. primacy is likely to be sustainable. America's own national interest – and the fortunes of a global liberal democratic order – depend on it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much, doctor.
 Ms. Mathews, you have a minute. Only kidding.

STATEMENT OF JESSICA T. MATHEWS

Ms. MATHEWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like to commend you on the farsightedness of the plan to hold this series of hearings and on the degree of bipartisanship that you and Mr. Shays have established. He laid out the components of a strategy, which begins, accurately, as he said, with determining priorities. Of all the steps he laid out, I will stop with the first one and try to lay out for you what seems to me the top priorities for our security strategy.

If it had been me, I would have called these hearings Threats, Risks, and Strategy in a Post-Iraq World, rather than a post-9/11 world, because I think that the events of that day have had far less impact on the real world than they had on the American psyche. The Iraq war, on the other hand, is a very different matter. It will be the turning point that changes the basic parameters of our security picture for decades, I suspect.

For one reason, the war's monopoly on our political energy, which has now stretched to 5 years, an eon in a time of fast-moving global change, is one of the greatest uncounted costs of this war, the degree to which it has sucked the oxygen from almost every other issue. And unless a major effort is made to reverse current trends, the fissures that are now stretching across the global non-proliferation regime will, I think, become the worst of these.

Among all the challenges that we face, only nuclear weapons pose an existential threat, and a world of 20 or 30 or more nuclear weapon states holds few prospects for avoiding nuclear catastrophe. The stability that we enjoyed for 50 years of the cold war didn't happen naturally; it happened because of unrelenting effort on the part of the two super powers and some very close misses. The likelihood that we could achieve that with 20 or 30 nuclear weapon states, which we could easily get to if the regime fails, is, I think, very close to zero; and the probability that some of all that weapons fuel will end up in the hands of terrorists is, I think, very close to one.

The President has called nuclear proliferation the greatest risk we face. I think that is right. But only sporadic attention has been given in the last half dozen years either to the risks in North Korea and Iran, but, more importantly, to the systemic weakness that is affecting the regime as a whole. We had 30 very good years under the NPT; it kept the number of nuclear weapon states far lower than its authors dared to hope. The bad news is that the last 10 years have been very bad ones, starting with the nuclear test by India and Pakistan in 1998 and then, 5 years later, the discovery of the A.Q. Khan network, where you had businessmen and scientists selling technology, bomb designs, and materials to whomever had the money to buy; individuals, the sellers, from more than a dozen countries.

The North Korean and Iranian programs that we came to understand in that period used the cover of the NPT to hide covert programs weapons and underlined that way the Achilles heel, what we now know to be the Achilles heel of the existing regime, which is

that no safeguards, no safeguards, no matter how good the IAEA is, can provide real protection when a country has direct access to plutonium or highly enriched uranium, weapons fuel.

The Bush administration made a radical change in our non-proliferation thinking, and one that urgently, I think, needs repair. In his 2003 State of the Union, the President described the threat as the greatest danger facing America and the world is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. This new formulation attracted very little attention at the time, again, because we were already consumed in the national debate over the Iraq war. But it was profound change.

Past Presidents of both parties, all of them, had focused on the weapons, but President Bush's new formulation shifted the focus from the weapons to the regimes, from the what to the who. And, of course, the United States got to decide who the good guys are and who the bad guys, even though our judgments, we know, change radically over the years, as they have, for example, with Saddam Hussein.

But shifting the focus from the what to the who, from the weapons to the regimes, means that it is a very short step to regime change as the answer. This is the hole that we are in today, one that diminishes our ability to deal with Iran, both directly and with other key players who balk at taking small steps in the fear that these will give legitimacy to a U.S. attack, or who make bad deals with Tehran in the mistaken notion that they are serving world security thereby.

But beyond Iran, there are two urgent threats that need addressing. First is the growing disenchantment among the non-nuclear weapon states who have come to believe, 15 years after the end of the cold war, that the nuclear weapon states never intend to uphold their end of the NPT bargain, i.e., nuclear disarmament. They are increasingly wondering why they should continue to uphold their end of the bargain.

The second threat is the glaring need to strengthen the regime: to impose meaningful penalties on states that abuse it as a cover for nuclear weapons programs, to eliminate direct access to bomb fuel in the non-nuclear weapons states, and to address the unanticipated threat from terrorists and corporate networks.

The United States, however, right now is in no position to lead on this effort. It cannot command followers. Before it can do so, it needs to re-establish its own credentials in this field, and there are four steps that it must take. First, renouncing unilateral preventive war—preventive war, not preemptive war; war in the absence of imminent threat declared unilaterally—second, renouncing unilateral regime change for the purpose of political change; ratifying the comprehensive test ban treaty; and canceling new nuclear weapons programs. The last because it moves in directly the opposite direction from a treaty commitment that we made and re-established in writing as recently as 1995.

Re-establishing arms control momentum with Russia is another priority, both important in its own right and for movement elsewhere around the World.

I have to add that the decision to base an anti-missile system in Poland and in the Czech Republic derails, I think, hope for much

progress in this direction for the time being. Pushing ahead with a system, that does not yet work, against a threat from Iran, that does not yet exist, at the expense of relations with a state, Russia, whose participation is essential, if the threat is to be prevented, is a choice that, in my view, can only be—these are all important, as is recovering our ability to listen, to really listen, to other countries and recovering our confidence in our ability to pursue national ends through diplomacy.

But restoring the trust in American leadership that has been lost so widely, as the chairman described at the outset, will only come from deeds, and it won't happen quickly. The good news in the nuclear area is that the critical steps that I have outlined are all under our control; we can take them alone, they don't have to be negotiated with anybody.

Let me turn much more briefly to three other challenges. Any short list like this is somewhat arbitrary, but, to me, these three issues, together with non-proliferation, stand out. First, China. History has no examples, that I know of, of a rapidly rising new power not producing at least tension, and usually outright conflict, as it enters the circle of major states. China knows this very well, and it has a strong desire to avoid conflict; hence, its peaceful rise. Conflict is bad for business, after all, and, above all, China wants to grow. Yet, if the path is any guide—and I think it is—it is going to be very difficult to manage China's rise peacefully, especially in an energy-constrained world that must begin to deal seriously with climate change.

The only silver lining to 9/11, I think, was that it put an end to another period of growing sense that China was the enemy, which, on September 10, 2001, was very much with us. That ended overnight and substituted a real enemy for a potential or imagined one.

We are on the right track now generally, I think, with China, but if, by our behavior, we, over the coming years, turn China into an enemy, if we get China wrong, that, other than the failure to rescue the non-proliferation regime, will be the single most dangerous worst mistake we can make.

The policies, on the other hand, that are currently wrong, that urgently need to be turned right, deal with the Middle East and the world of Islam. Olivier Roy, the distinguished French expert in this field, points out that the West has tried three different approaches with this area and with democracy, and that all three have failed: we have tried to strengthen the existing authoritarian regimes; we have tried reforming the existing authoritarian regimes, almost, in some cases, to the point of their collapse; and we have tried to impose democracy from scratch. None have worked.

What we have not tried to do is to build democracy with the participation of the prevailing political forces in these states, and those forces today are Islamists. They cannot be end-run; they must be engaged. We should be engaging with moderate Islamist forces, and by that I mean those that have renounced the use of violence as a political tool, even when we find others of their views uncomfortable or even abhorrent.

The other precondition of success in the Middle East will be a much more vigorous and engaged effort on Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, and one that is and is seen to be more even-handed.

Finally, we have to tackle climate change, which means that we, at long last, as Bob Lieber just said, need a national energy policy. Voluntary policies are a joke. Research-only policies are a cop-out. Research is necessary, but not sufficient. And no serious national objective has ever been pursued on a voluntary basis. The endless and fruitless debate over whether to use price or regulation to pursue energy policies should end with the recognition that an effective policy requires a mix of both. The search for magic bullets, from oil shale to fuel cells to biofuels should be seen as a recurring hunt for a simple solution to a very difficult problem that will never work. And the policy must begin, must be built on, must be based on the recognition that, by far, the largest, cheapest, most quickly accessible and most climate sensitive energy resource that we have is drastic improvements in energy efficiency in every sector.

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your patience. I hope these thoughts, this identification of these, I think, four overwhelming priorities for us are helpful to you as you pursue this daunting security agenda.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Mathews follows:]

Congressional Testimony

**SIX YEARS LATER: ASSESSING LONG-TERM
THREATS, RISKS AND THE U.S. STRATEGY
FOR SECURITY IN A POST-9/11 WORLD**

Testimony by Jessica T. Mathews
President
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
Washington, DC
October 10, 2007

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT

FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

WASHINGTON DC • MOSCOW • BEIJING • BEIRUT • BRUSSELS

Written Testimony of

Jessica Tuchman Mathews
President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

I want to commend this committee for the farsightedness of this series of hearings. While I appreciate that the point is to get beyond the all encompassing focus on Iraq, I do want to begin by noting that the series might better be titled Threats, Risks and Strategy in a Post-Iraq World because the events of 9/11 have had far less of an effect on the real world than that day had on the American psyche.

Iraq is a very different matter. This war is the turning point that has and will change the basic parameters of American security for – in all likelihood – many decades.

The war's monopoly on our political energy has now stretched to 5 years – an eon in a time of fast-moving global change. One of its greatest – as yet uncounted – costs is the degree to which it has sucked the oxygen from almost every other issue. A dramatically changing global climate might as well not be happening. The reappearance of huge federal budget deficits is hardly noticed. The need for change in an unsustainable energy policy has barely surfaced. And, in these five years a number of international security problems have grown, from neglect, into full blown crises. Unless a major effort is made to reverse current trends, the fissures now spreading across the global nonproliferation regime, could easily become the worst of these.

Among all the challenges we face, only nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to the US. A world with 20 or 30 or more nuclear weapons states (NWS) holds few prospects for avoiding nuclear catastrophe. The stability that prevailed for the 50 years of the Cold War didn't just happen. It required unrelenting effort by both superpowers – and some very near misses. The likelihood that a nuclear outbreak could be avoided with 20 powers calculating their interests against all the others is vanishingly small. The probability that some of all that weapons fuel would end up in the hands of terrorists is about 1.

The effect of such a proliferation of nuclear states on the US is quite clear. Because we are and will remain by far the world's greatest conventional power, we will suffer the greatest relative loss of power as the number of states possessing the "great leveler" grow.

And of course, while deterrence still works against states, it is not effective against nonstate groups with neither populations nor territory to protect.

The President has called nuclear proliferation the greatest risk we face. He is correct in that. But only sporadic attention has been given in the past half dozen years to the nuclear threats from North Korea and Iran, and little if any to the systemic weakness spreading across the regime itself.

The good news is that for 40 years the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has kept the number of nuclear states far lower than its authors dared hope. The bad news is that the past 10 years have been very bad ones for the treaty and for the huge body of rules and institutions that have been built around it. This period began with nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998. Five years later the commercial network headed by Pakistan's A. Q. Khan came to light, involving scientists and businessmen from a dozen countries selling technology, equipment and nuclear bomb designs to whomever could pay. The North Korean and Iranian programs – both using the NPT as a cover for illegal weapons programs – underlined the regime's Achilles heel which is that *no* safeguards can provide real protection when a country has direct access to weapons fuel – plutonium or highly enriched uranium.

The Bush administration made a radical change in nonproliferation thinking and policy – one that urgently needs repair. In his 2003 State of the Union address, the President described the threat of weapons of mass destruction this way: “The gravest danger facing America and the world is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.” This new formulation attracted little attention at the time – again because the country was already consumed with the debate over the Iraq war – but it was profound. Whereas past presidents of both parties had focused on the weapons, this formulation shifted the focus to the regimes that have or seek them. And, of course, the U.S. decides who are the good guys and who are not (even though, as we should remember, our own judgments change radically over the years. We supported Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war, for example.) Having shifted the focus from the weapons to the regimes, it is a short step to regime change as the answer.

This is the hole we are in today – one that diminishes our ability to deal with Iran: both directly with Tehran and with other key players who balk at taking small steps in the fear that that would give legitimacy to a U.S. attack or who make bad deals with Tehran in the mistaken notion that they are serving world security thereby.

Beyond Iran, there are two urgent threats to the system: a growing disenchantment among the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) who have come to believe, 15 years after the end of the Cold War, that the NWS never intend to keep up their end of the bargain: nuclear disarmament. The second is the glaring need to strengthen the regime: to impose meaningful penalties on states that abuse it as a cover for illegal weapons programs; to eliminate direct access to bomb fuel in NNWS and to address the threats

from terrorists and corporate networks that were unanticipated when the treaty was written 40 years ago.

The US however, is not in a position to lead in this effort. Before it can do so it needs to reestablish its own credentials. To do so it will have to:

- Revoke the National Security Strategy of 2002, which still stands, focusing on regimes rather than weapons;
- Renounce unilateral preventive war,
- Ratify the CTBT, and
- Cancel development of new nuclear weapons

Reestablishing arms control momentum with Russia is another priority. I must add, however, that the administration's decision to base an antimissile system in Poland and the Czech Republic derails hope for much progress in this direction for the time being. Pushing ahead with a system that does not yet work, against a threat from Iran that does not yet exist, at the expense of relations with a state, Russia, whose participation is essential if the threat is to be prevented, is a choice that can only be called incomprehensible. This too needs reconsideration.

A great deal of attention is being given these days to the style, tone and rhetoric of U.S. foreign policy. These are all important – as is recovering the ability to listen – really listen – to others, and retrieving confidence in our ability to conduct successful diplomacy as the principal means to gain our ends. But restoring the trust in American leadership that has been so widely lost will only come from *deeds* and it won't happen overnight. The good news in the nuclear area is that the critical steps are all under our own control.

Let me turn much more briefly to three other challenges. Any short list such as this is necessarily arbitrary, but to me these three – and nonproliferation – stand out.

First, China. History has no examples of a rapidly rising new power not producing at least tension and usually outright conflict as a result of its entry into the circle of major states. China is well aware of this and it has a strong desire to avoid conflict – hence the slogan “Peaceful Rise.” Conflict is bad for business, after all, and above all else, China is determined to grow. Yet if the past is any guide, it is going to be difficult to manage China's rise peacefully, especially in a resource constrained world that must begin to deal seriously with climate change.

The only silver lining to 9/11 was that it put an end for the time being to the swelling of another period of America determined to see China as an enemy. That ended overnight, substituting Saddam Hussein, a real enemy, for a potential or imagined one.

We are on a pretty good track now, but if, by our behavior, we turn China into an enemy; if we get China wrong, that – other than the failure to rescue and repair the nonproliferation regime – will be the single worst, most dangerous security mistake we can make.

The policies that we must urgently turn from wrong to right, deal with the Middle East and with the world of Islam. Olivier Roy, the distinguished French expert in this field, points out that the West has tried three approaches in the Middle East and all three have failed. We have tried to strengthen existing authoritarian regimes; we have tried to push for reform of such regimes (often to the point of their collapse), and we have tried to impose democracy from scratch. None have worked. What we have *not* tried to do is to build democracy with the participation of the existing political forces – and those forces today are Islamist. They cannot be end run – they must be engaged. We should be thoughtfully engaging with moderate Islamist forces; by which I mean those that renounce violence as a political tool, even when and if we find others of their views abhorrent.

A precondition of success in the Middle East will be a much more vigorous and engaged effort on the Israeli-Palestinian situation and one that is and is seen to be more evenhanded.

Finally, we have to tackle global climate change, which means we – at long last – need a national energy policy. Voluntary policies and research-only policies should be seen for the cop out that they are. Research is necessary but not sufficient and no serious national objective has ever been made voluntary. The endless, fruitless debate over whether to use price or regulation should end with the recognition that an effective policy requires both. The search for silver bullets – from oil shale to fuel cells to biofuels – should be seen as a recurring hunt for a magical solution that would avoid our having to make real, society-wide change. A realistic energy policy must begin – must be built on – the recognition that by far the largest, cheapest, most quickly accessible and most climate-sensitive energy resource we have – by far – is drastic improvements in energy efficiency, in every sector.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your patience. I hope these thoughts prove useful as you look ahead at a daunting security agenda.

Mr. TIERNEY. They are incredibly helpful to us. For all three witnesses, thank you very much. I am almost inclined to just get unanimous consent to let the three of you keep on talking, without the questions, but being who we are, that is not likely to happen.

I think we might retract the 10 minute period and go 5 minutes, but keep the caveat that people should feel free to interject an intervention if they want. As long as that isn't abused, we will let discussion flow as freely as possible.

Let me just ask one question to start. How would the threat represented by 9/11 fit into the overall strategic priorities that this country has? If you had to look and say that you had the 9/11 threat and then you have all the other things we have to attend, where would you fit that in and how would you address that?

Whoever wants to speak.

Mr. LIEBER. It seems to me that threat is overriding. Inevitably, decisions about policy, large and small, involve tradeoffs. For example, there is a genuine debate, as there has been in this country for two centuries, about where you draw the line or where you strike the balance between civil liberties and our historical freedoms, and a long continuum vis-a-vis taking strong actions to reduce our vulnerability and so on. There are not easy answers to that, but I would say that whether on that issue or a wide range of things that the three of us have discussed, the importance of threat ought to be the overriding concern.

By contrast, there are those who talk about terrorism as a police problem. I respectfully disagree. So I don't have a specific actionable response for you other than to say that threat symbolized by 9/11 and incorporating the elements I cited, of which proliferation, I think, is clearly part, has to be the overriding consideration, whether you are thinking not just about wiretapping, but about costs and tradeoffs or gasoline taxes or forced deployments, or what have you.

Ms. MATHEWS. Mr. Chairman, as I suggested, I think 9/11 meant more to us psychologically than it means in purely national security terms, and far less now than does the basket of issues that have been created by the Iraq war. I don't mean to suggest that terrorism is not important; it is. And Bob has laid out a lot of the issues that swarm around it. But it doesn't pose an existential threat to us, and nuclear weapons still do. And we are on the verge of a breakdown, I believe, in the regime. That is really the crux of the Iran problem. We have now 12 countries in the Middle East that have gone to the IAEA and expressed an interest in starting nuclear energy and enrichment programs.

Mr. TIERNEY. May I interject something here?

Ms. MATHEWS. Sure.

Mr. TIERNEY. What is your opinion if the United States was serious about working toward the imposition of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, the impact that would have on the larger problems that we are confronting?

Ms. MATHEWS. I think a nuclear weapons-free zone is doable over the long, longer term. Right now, we are in no position to push for that or anything else, as I suggested. We don't have—the Carnegie Endowment, 2 years ago, did a major study on nuclear proliferation called Universal Compliance. We took the draft of that study to 22

countries. We talked all over the world about it. We had 33 countries at our non-proliferation conference this past June, and the feeling that I described of utter unwillingness to consider any steps to strengthen the existing regime and, indeed, in many cases a sense of real outrage at the nuclear weapon states for not doing their end of the bargain; and then, on top of it, to the United States both with respect to the CTBT, which countries are very well aware of, and the new nuclear weapons programs. To lead, you have to have followers, and we are not in a position to command followers right now on this set of issues. And, of course, I think a nuclear weapons-free zone, realistically, will require an Israeli-Palestinian peace and some resolution of the current Iranian program. So it is way down the road.

Mr. TIERNEY. So you see that as a subsequent step as opposed to an initial step?

Ms. MATHEWS. I do.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

I have very little time left.

Mr. Isaacson, I don't know if you wanted to interject on that, on the question of how it fits into the overall privacy.

Mr. ISAACSON. [Remarks off microphone.]

Mr. TIERNEY. OK.

Mr. Shays. Mr. Duncan.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Georgie Anne Geyer, the very respected foreign policy columnist, wrote, in 2003, a few months after we had gone to war in Iraq, at this time, that Americans would inevitably come to a point where they had to decide whether they wanted a government that provided services at home or one that seeks empire across the globe.

Ann McFeatters, a columnist for the Scripps Howard newspaper chain, wrote a couple of years ago that we were headed for what she described as a financial tsunami when the baby-boomers started retiring in heavy numbers in 2008 and in the years following.

Before the first Gulf war, which I voted for, I heard briefings from General Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell and others about Saddam Hussein's elite republican troops and how great the threat was. And then I watched those so-called elite troops surrender to CNN camera crews and empty tanks, and I thought then that the threat had been greatly exaggerated. Now, before this Gulf war, I was at the White House and they told me that Saddam Hussein's total military budget was a little over two-tenths of 1 percent of ours, most of which he spent—they didn't say this, but most of which, it turned out later, he had spent building castles and protecting himself and his family.

Now we have hundreds of registered homeland security lobbyists and we have thousands of defense lobbyists all pushing us to spend more, and, yet, we have these estimates that this war is—we are already at \$750 billion or so, and now we are soon going to be asked for \$200 billion more; and counting future military costs and medical costs and so forth, they are talking about \$2 billion. Then we have some people wanting us to take action against Iran that could potentially be even more expensive.

What I am wondering about is this. How do we achieve the balance? Because the politically correct, politically popular thing to do

is, when they use the word security, always say that we are not doing enough and always say that we need to do more. In fact, the Wall Street Journal wrote, a few months after 9/11, that we should give four times the scrutiny to any bill that has the word security in it because they saw that every department and agency was coming to us asking for more security funding.

Yet, some of us wonder if we are going to be able to pay our veterans' pensions and our social security and our Medicare and Medicaid and so forth in the years ahead if we don't somehow look at these threats realistically. We can't spend the entire Federal budget just because somebody—keep increasing this spending just because somebody says security or threats. How do we achieve that balance?

Second, I read a column by Walter Williams, the conservative columnist, that said al Qaida—this was a year or so ago—that al Qaida was now less than 3,000 members, most of whom were people living at home with their parents and had almost no money. I heard a talk last week by Larry Johnson, the former CIA analyst who is now a Defense contractor, who said al Qaida was now down to about 600. I know they have thousands of al Qaida sympathizers, but I am wondering if you know how many people are in al Qaida.

And then, just so I get it all out, third, I am wondering what your predictions are for Iran. Do you think that we will be making what are politely referred to sometimes as searchable strikes and taking out nuclear facilities any time within the next 2 or 3 years? I would like your predictions.

That is three questions. Mr. Isaacson, we will start with you, I guess.

Mr. ISAACSON. OK. I think your challenge here is to balance an emotionalism that comes both after 9/11 and from the existential threat that we might feel from radical Islamic jihadism, as Bob so aptly described it, and a realism that says how do we effectively counter it. And this is a very difficult question. If you ask me is our invasion of and continued presence in Iraq doing more to help or to hurt radical Islamic jihadism in this world, I am not sure there is a clear answer. So it is not simply a matter of spending billions more on military in Iraq.

This is not for me getting into the argument about Iraq, it is just that this is a complex problem, when you say does it help or hurt the threat of radical Islamic jihadism.

So I think we have to be very realistic. As I think you are suggesting, we need to inject a note of realism in this. This is a threat, but not one that demands us abandoning the economy of the United States and other priorities. And in answer to both the chairman's question and others, how do you put this in the ranking of priorities, General Powell has said repeatedly that the jihadists cannot destroy American society; only we can destroy American society by betting too contorted in this war against the jihadists. So I think there is a note of realism that you are trying to inject that I would agree with.

On Iran, I think that if I look at this panel and on this panel, I may be the person least qualified to guess what we are going to

do surgically in Iran or not, so I am not going to—especially with people recording what I say—try to pretend an expertise in that.

Mr. LIEBER. Congressman Duncan, let me respond to part of your list of really comprehensive and vital questions. First, on the financial side, it is certainly the case that America needs money spent on its foreign policy needs and security, to be spent as widely and as prudently and efficiently and effectively as possible.

I would note, in terms of affordability, that despite the enormous costs that the United States now faces for defense for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, for rebuilding its own forces' equipment, right now we are spending approximately 4.2 percent of gross domestic product. That is contrasted to about 2.93 percent just before 9/11. But you have to set it against a prior crisis in American history. During the height of the Reagan buildup in the mid-1980's, the number was about 6.6 percent, and for large portions of the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations it was into double digits, 10 percent or sometimes more.

We have the capacity to spend that without destroying our economy. But this brings up an issue that Aaron Friedberg of Princeton University has recently written about knowledgeably: the urgent need for a much more effective mechanism for policy management and coordination, which combines military and defense issues, political dimensions, economics, and so forth. Because of the complexity of the way the executive branch is organized, the complexity of the committee structure in Congress, and the nature of the issues themselves, we haven't had the degree of coordination that ought to be the case and compared to what existed sometimes in the past.

Very briefly on one other point. Bruce Hoffman at Georgetown, who is a prominent and superbly qualified member of our faculty in security studies and one of the country's leading terrorism experts, has recently said that al Qaida is back. They were badly damaged initially, but they have recovered a good deal in terms of capacity and so forth. So I think there is a very real al Qaida risk.

Finally, I would quote the dean of our Georgetown School of Foreign Service, my colleague, Bob Gallucci, who was an opponent of the use of force in Iraq, but who has written that he is very concerned about the risk of a concealed nuclear device going off in one or more American cities sometime in the next 5 to 10 years. That is related to terrorism. So I don't think, despite the relatively small size of al Qaida overall, that we ought to minimize or otherwise overlook the gravity of the risk it represents, all things considered.

Ms. MATHEWS. I am trying to choose among all the questions that you have asked.

Mr. TIERNEY. You are probably going to have to put that on, Ms. Mathews, your mic.

Ms. MATHEWS. Sorry.

What to say? Bob is certainly right that, as a percent of GDP, we have spent much more. We haven't spent it in a globalized economy before and we have much higher spending on other priorities, particularly healthcare, now than we have before.

If Congress wanted to save \$200 billion a year, it could, for the same security, out of the existing \$600 billion defense budget, but there is a whole lot of politics buried in that. But I think every close student of the defense budget believes that at least a third

is wasted. But I recognize that is a politically unrealistic thing, perhaps, to say.

Since the others haven't, let me address Iran. I don't think that it is likely that we are going to attack Iran, because I think the arguments against it are so overwhelming and so overwhelmingly obvious. I should say that I also didn't think we were going to go into Iraq, because it seemed to me really quite stupid at the time. So you take this for what it is worth. But we have a very limited target set in Iran. There are probably facilities that we don't know about. We do not, of course, have the troops to go on the ground, and air strikes without ground forces are a minimal, modest utility.

We are currently dealing in a world of Sunni terrorism, and if we attack Iran, we will add a whole new layer of Shiite terrorism. They have made that very clear, and they clearly have the capacity to unleash it.

And, finally, we will take a country that hasn't, to the best of our knowledge, made a firm decision either way on whether their security requires nuclear weapons, and create one that is absolutely 100 percent permanently committed to having them. And, finally, it will underline the lesson to other countries that if you think you have a serious opponent, a serious enemy in the United States, you need nuclear weapons to protect yourself.

So, for all those reasons—I also think the military has a very clear appreciation of all of those points. So I think it is unlikely. I also think it would be, it is probably obvious, a catastrophe for the United States.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Ms. Mathews.

Mr. Duncan, I can tell you that we have some plans to perhaps have some hearings on that issue of Iran and consequences and plans as well, so we will keep you informed of that.

Mr. Cooper, Mr. Isaacson is ready for his exam, his orals.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am grateful to you for having this very important hearing. I am sorry it is perhaps not getting the attention that the hearing down the hall is that is more involved with using foreign policy and security issues as a domestic political club.

I am proud that Walter is here. I have been in awe of his career for a long time. He brought an excellence to journalism that is rarely seen. I also liked his four books, isn't it? Kissinger, Wise Men, Ben Franklin, and the latest and greatest, Einstein. If he can humanize that genius, you are an amazing writer, and you are. So this will not be an exam. I am delighted to get this wisdom in three parts.

I have a particular personal interest because on the Armed Services Committee they have recently established a panel on roles and missions, and that is Pentagon speak for redoing the National Security Act and Goldwater nickels and things like that involve not only Pentagon, but other agencies. So I welcome your expertise in that area as well.

Two questions primarily. First of all, the list of threats that are on page 2 of Dr. Lieber's testimony is so startling that I often think that we here on the Hill let down our guard. Like if the group of 100 foreign policy experts is correct, that 80 percent chance of a terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11 within a decade; and then an-

other panel of experts, within 10 years, 29 percent chance of a nuclear attack in the United States, 40 percent of a radiological attack, 70 percent of some kind of CBRN event. That, plus the Gallucci statement, all those are total game changers.

So I would like ask the other panelists if you share Dr. Lieber's perception, that grim view of our near term future, 5 to 10 years, facing threats with that level of probability.

Ms. MATHEWS. I have a modest view of those sorts of numbers because I know how I feel when I agreed to answer one of those polls, which is, you know, you look at it and you sort of pick a number out of the damp air.

Mr. TIERNEY. Is your mic on, Ms. Mathews?

Ms. MATHEWS. Sorry.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Ms. MATHEWS. So I just don't believe them. But, yes, one of the big reasons why non-proliferation is so important is because of the terrorist threat. But terrorism without nuclear weapons is not either an existential threat nor, I would argue, even a strategic one. So that is the context in which I put it. Imagine 9/11 without the Twin Towers designed in the way they were, engineered in the way they were. It would have been a totally different event. So that is one of the serious reasons why I put the emphasis on the non-proliferation needs, and there we do face a really serious set of threats that deserves far greater attention than we have given it.

Mr. COOPER. Walter, do you have such a view?

Mr. ISAACSON. Yes, I would like to say, as Jessica did in a way, that we are entering a world where we are faced with a great deal of threat and hatred from radical Islamic jihadism, and a new type of world in which non-state actors and cross-border—not nation states, but others, are doing that threat. And, as Jessica said, I see the biggest problem there being the spread of weapons of mass destruction, most particularly nuclear weapons.

I do feel that it is likely we are going to have terrorism in this country. There are going to be terrorist attacks. And I am going to say something that I think would be difficult for perhaps others to say, those of us in think tanks or more insulated: we have to keep that in perspective, that you and I lived in Great Britain in a time in which there were lots of terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland. What makes a terrorist attack an existential threat, as Jessica said, is when it is combined with things such as nuclear weapons.

So I know that Bob Gallucci is talking about chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons as possible notions of attack. I think that we should not contort ourselves so much to fear terrorism as an existential threat as, instead, to define it more specifically as jihadist groups acquiring nuclear weapons and combining that with a desire to attack the United States.

Mr. LIEBER. Congressman, may I followup?

Thank you for citing those passages. I think the point is important. I would note, of course, these are educated guesses by smart people. We are not talking about the laws of physics, but I think those guesses or projections or estimates do need to be taken very seriously and with the gravity they suggest.

I think I have a slight difference with my colleagues on the panel, Jessica and Walter, in that I don't think we should minimize

what the disruption of 9/11 was all about, even though it wasn't nuclear. Not only did 3,000 people die, but it paralyzed the American economy, transportation system, communications for periods of time. By one estimate, it may have cost as much as \$1 trillion in overall effects and so forth.

Obviously, nuclear terrorism is in a class by itself. We should not minimize the peril that mass casualty terrorism represents to a very complex, very sophisticated economy with considerable vulnerabilities.

One more point. Our European brothers and sisters often point to things like the IRA, ETA in Spain, the Red Brigades and say, oh, you Americans have just lost your virginity and you are over-reacting. Well, I beg to disagree. In those instances the things that those groups were doing did not represent the kind of impact that 9/11 and potential future attacks could represent. Moreover, the things that al Qaida and radical Islamists want are things that no American government could ever, I think, concede to, because they are so fundamental to the nature of our society.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Cooper.

Mr. Higgins.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to commend you on this very important hearing, an extraordinary panel, and very, very good questions about a profound problem that is not only pervasive, but seemingly growing.

I remember the former defense secretary said that the measure of the effectiveness on the war on terrorism, are we capturing, are we detaining, are we stopping more terrorist activity than is being created. It seems like, particularly with the situation relative to al Qaida, al Qaida is morphed into al Qaidaism. There are groups that are al Qaida inspired, al Qaida linked, and they have also found themselves to be a global influence. You know, there are intelligence reports now that say that al Qaida is in the Sudan. Al Qaida is obviously in Iraq. It is an ideology. I often wonder if this is an ideology that is based on a twisted interpretation of the Quran, where are the moderate voices within the Arab Muslim community that are standing up to this? What is our role in helping to influence a challenge internally to this threat?

The other thing that I am struck by, when you visit places like Afghanistan, when you visit places like Iraq, when you read about places like Iran, is the relative youth of the population. We just visited, a group of members of this subcommittee, Afghanistan and Pakistan last month, and I was very impressed by the U.S. military, with their level of sophistication, with their acceptance that you don't win this war by the use of military force alone. This is, as many of you have said in different ways, a battle for the hearts and minds of the population, the imagination of the people there, who have been humiliated, who have been disaffected through centuries of oppression. I think it requires, in terms of U.S. foreign policy, a much more sophisticated mind, a much more strategic approach.

When we left Afghanistan, after we thought we defeated the Taliban and al Qaida, to divert resources to Iraq, supposedly to

give breathing room for the National Unity Government to achieve political reconciliation, it seems as though we gave breathing room in Afghanistan for the regrowth, for the reconstitution of al Qaida and other terrorist groups.

My question is, is it too late? Have we allowed this thing to evolve to the point where we have lost control of it? Because the next al Qaida attack on the United States likely won't come from Afghanistan, likely won't come from the Middle East; it could come from Madrid, it could come from London, England. This is a problem. Are we prepared for it? What lessons have we learned and what lessons can we learn moving forward?

Mr. ISAACSON. Let me take the first crack, which is I don't think it is too late, but I do think that what you have put your finger on is that, like the cold war, this is going to be, as they called it back then, a long twilight struggle. It is not going to be in 5 years we declare victory against Islamic jihadism and get to come home; it is a 40, 50-year, two generations, just like the cold war was. And that is because it comes in two components like the cold war. The first is a real security component, you know, protecting against Soviet missiles in that case; in this case protecting against terrorism with defensive measures and some offensive measures.

But, second, like the cold war, it is a long ideological struggle and, at the moment, as you said, the former secretary of defense's question may be right, we may be creating a broader range of terrorists by some of what has happened recently.

So I think we have to focus on a long ideological fight for our values in a world in which it is going against us right now with the spread of al Qaidaism, as you put it, and that includes the values of tolerance, that people can have different religious or other beliefs and you can live in a society with them; and the basic sense that individual rights should be protected. And we are going to win that battle economically, morally, and through the expressions of our values, but we have to really engage in that struggle, which is not something I see us doing right now.

Mr. LIEBER. Briefly. I agree, by the way, completely that it is going to be a long struggle. The analogy with the cold war is inexact, but not bad. It is probably the most useful analogy if you want one. It is a struggle ultimately for the future of Arab Muslim world, with some extensions, for example, Pakistan. We can influence, we can help, but ultimately that struggle is going to be played out within those societies.

It is also worth noting it is not only or all about us. Think of the murder of Van Gogh in The Netherlands, eviscerated on an Amsterdam street; or the threats to the very courageous Somali-Dutch woman, Hursi Ali; or bombings in North Africa; or the killing of children in front of their parents in Afghanistan or Algeria; or the London and German bombers, Glasgow and London Airport or the thwarted attempt in Germany where you had indigenous people with German and British citizenship; or al Qaida of Iraq killing Shiites and blowing up Shiite shrines like the Golden Dome in Samarra.

The 2002 Arab Human Development Report, written for the U.N. Development Program by 15 Arab economists, referred to three desperate deficits in the Arab Muslim world: one, in the role and

treatment of women; two, in knowledge and information; and, three, in liberty and political freedom. There is a core problem which is very deep-seeded.

One other point in passing, but I don't think this should all be gloom and doom. I think one very encouraging sign of the past 6 years is that while there have been a number of instances in Europe and elsewhere where indigenous and sometimes ostensibly well integrated Muslims or Arabs who sometimes were citizens of this country, sometimes not, carried out terrorist attacks or were interrupted in major attack plans, that we have been blessedly largely free of that in the United States; and I think a lot of that has to do with the nature of American society: adaptable, flexible, and which gives its Arab and Muslim immigrants and citizens the sense they are Americans and are fully accepted. I think that is the strength of America, and it is certainly one element, I think, of why we have not, so far, faced a repeat of 9/11.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, doctor.

Thank you, Mr. Higgins.

Mr. Welch.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank all of you.

Listening, I don't want to say it is depressing, but I will make an observation. Everything you are saying that we should be doing we are not. Basically, institution-building for the modern threats, there has been none; the definition of what the conflict is is still debated, but, actually, there has been, I think, an operational conclusion that it is all military all the time; and there has been a relaxation on the effort to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

I am interested in whether the other panelists agree with Dr. Mathews on this question of whether Iraq simply has to be dealt with before we are going to be able to address these profound transformational foreign policy questions for security, because it certainly is the sense that I have, sitting here, that it is all Iraq all the time and it is just a powerful impediment to any clear thinking.

On one of these trips when we were in the Middle East, when we went over there, we met with the King of Jordan, and I was thinking that he was going to be talking about Iraq and how that had to be dealt with. Of course, they have to deal with hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees and it is very unstable, and that was third in his list of problems. The first one for him was the Arab-Israeli conflict; second was Lebanon; and then a distant third was Iraq. And, of course, over here it is all Iraq all the time.

So my question, I guess, to Mr. Isaacson and Dr. Lieber is whether you are in agreement that if we are going to even start considering the recommendations you are making, somehow, someway, we have to get Iraq behind us.

Mr. ISAACSON. I am not sure I would take fully that premise from Jessica's testimony, so I don't want to put the words in her mouth, but let me address the question.

Mr. WELCH. Well, she can respond too.

Mr. ISAACSON. I do believe, personally, that this is a multi-pronged approach, and the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue is very important right now, and you see some hopeful signs,

I would say, in Dr. Rice's trip. I also agree that there is an enormous amount we should be doing that we aren't, whether it is their building madrassas around the world and, you know, we are not even close in figuring out how we are going to have education programs, English language, technology programs. The fact that we cannot compete with the madrassa movement, when we know how to do things like that, we are just not doing it, is appalling to me; and that we are letting more of their education, as opposed to us having technology centers, education centers. We are doing some of that, and I am involved with some of that, but I just wish it were 100 times more.

On Iraq, I don't think it has to be solved totally first, before you get on to anything else. I think it would be a very unwise approach. I do think that the current implementation of our Iraq strategy and the current occupation strategy—I don't mean occupation to be a loaded term, but what we are doing there—is actually very bad right now for us dealing with the other problems.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

Mr. LIEBER. I share your sense that there is—there is a term I like to use, the problem of the *reductio ad Iraqum*.

Mr. WELCH. Oh, I use that all the time too. [Laughter.]

Mr. LIEBER. Two years of Latin in Chicago public schools serves me well.

It is certainly true that Iraq is the elephant in the living room. There is a tendency to see everything else through that lens. I think the virtue of the hearings that this committee has called is to encourage us to not ignore Iraq, but to try to look beyond it, especially for whoever is responsible for the Presidency in January 2009.

I would also note, if we look back, that at the time we went into Iraq, 70 percent of the American public, more than three-fifths of the Congress, two-thirds of the European governments supported that judgment. It proves to have been a very fateful decision. The consequences of our involvement in Iraq are still not entirely clear, and the judgment of history may be ultimately quite harsh or it may not be.

I am a little more cautiously optimistic about the current strategy or tactic in Iraq. I think that after the fall of Baghdad there were serious failures in what to do, but that the policy being followed by General Petraeus has at least the possibility that it may be turning things around. I use lots of cautions, and I think the advantage is to know what you don't know. It remains to be seen what will occur in Iraq. There is at least a possibility that the situation will stabilize.

Clearly, Iraq is having an impact elsewhere, but I think it is also the case, as was mentioned in the question, that other countries are looking at other issues. I suggested some of them, Jessica has suggested others of them, and I think there is more of a willingness to look beyond Iraq.

Last, in Europe, for instance, for those of us who travel and go there a good deal, the kind of bitterness and heated debate that marked the years 2002, 2003, 2004 has subsided, and I think there is a willingness to try to look beyond Iraq, rather than focus on that to the exclusion of other priorities.

Ms. MATHEWS. I didn't mean to suggest there is nothing we can do, because——

Mr. WELCH. I didn't hear that.

Ms. MATHEWS. And I want to add to my earlier remarks a couple of other things I think we can change. But I do believe that everything we are doing, as you suggest—I mean, the big cost is simply the oxygen. It is just impossible to get away from. And the amount of political capital that we all, as a country, have to focus on this, there is very little left over for other huge priorities.

And I am under no illusion that we could stop terrorism by changing U.S. policies, but we can affect it in a big way by a number of what I think are really, really bad policy choices, and I want to add also to the prior question three.

One is the question of a permanent U.S. presence in Iraq. At the end of Iraq week up here, a lot of the media said, oh, gosh, you know, Patraeus came and talked for hours and hours and nothing changed. But, in fact, in my judgment, something very big changed in the President's speech: when he said we are going to have fewer troops and a bigger mission. He said what Secretary Gates said at the beginning of June, which was a long-term presence on the model of Japan and Korea.

The whole Arab world believes that we went into Iraq in order to dismantle the most powerful Arab state and get our hands on its oil for Israel's benefit and our own. That is what they believe already. And, of course, one of the reasons that we chose to go in was because of the problem of the current American presence in Saudi Arabia, military presence.

If we choose to do this, and do it without public discussion, without involvement of the Congress—and, as far as I know, there has never been a national security meeting on this subject or a debate within the administration on the wisdom of building permanent U.S. presence in Iraq—it will be one of the biggest mistakes of this whole business.

The passage of amendments forbidding the spending of money to create a permanent presence is a waste of time, because the administration has figured out who can say what is permanent. Fifty years, not permanent. But 50 years is a great big mistake, in my judgment. If it were me, I would be up here having bicameral, bipartisan hearings on the wisdom of this choice. Not in the context of the administration's position, necessarily, but whether this is something the United States wants to do. I think it has everything to do with the supply of people to al Qaida.

Second, we need a new policy on democracy promotion. In particular, we need a set of policies to separate democracy promotion from regime change, which is what it is believed to be in most of the rest of the world, not just the Middle East. Russia, for example; China. This is a subject where we can affect our destiny and the likelihood that we will face terrorist attacks.

And, finally, Pakistan. I am a deep, deep, deep pessimist about our ability to turn Afghanistan. Again, history tells me this one is going to take 10 times what we are willing to give it. But Pakistan we cannot afford not to be paying an awful lot more attention to. And I think we do have some levers to affect the supply of terrorists in Pakistan.

So my point is while we are paying a terrible price in Iraq, and will continue to for many, many years, there are things that will make it either better or rose.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Welch.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for holding this hearing and the great job you have been doing on this subcommittee. It certainly has been very helpful for all the Members.

I appreciate your last comment about Pakistan. I just came from an Armed Services Committee hearing where the issue is Pakistan, its stability, our relations with Pakistan, and the issues of the war on terror, Taliban, and our ability to be effective in Afghanistan, al Qaida, and perhaps even Osama bin Laden himself seeking or having refuge in Pakistan.

One of the discussion topics has been the problems and difficulties that Musharraf is having in his own country, and I was wondering if you might each comment for a moment on the issue of the difficulties there. And I am particularly interested in if you decouple his relationship with the United States, does he still have problems, and what are those problems, and how should we look to our policies to affect a greater relationship with Pakistan and an acceptance of greater respect and view by the people of Pakistan of the United States as an ally and a friend.

Mr. LIEBER. There is a lot of uncertainty here, but in the first instance it would be my sense that his problems are overwhelmingly internal. They have to do with the nature of Pakistani society, the fact that the military has ruled, either directly or behind the scenes, that country for a very long time with the very unequal distribution of wealth in that society, which is really quite extraordinary; the role of the intelligence service, the ISI, and so forth. The embrace of the United States probably adds something to his problem internally, but in other respects can be a source of strength because of economic and military support.

The problem there, as in some other countries in the Middle East, is that some Middle Eastern, Muslim, and Arab leaders have used a deliberate tactic—it is true, I think, in Egypt—of apres moi le deluge, that is to say, deliberately cracking down on moderate opposition elements who would like to use the democratic process, be non-violent and so on, in order to say, look, you may not like what I am doing, but the people who are out there who would take over otherwise are the really, really bad guys. Sometimes that is very exaggerated and sometimes not, but I think it is something you have to weigh.

There is an argument about Pakistan that if Musharraf fell, it would not be the extreme radical Islamists who would seize power, and that there are other oppositional elements, but both civil and military leaders of Pakistan in the last four decades have left a lot to be desired vis-a-vis their own people.

Ms. MATHEWS. I agree with all of that. Certainly, his problems go beyond his connections to the United States. I just would underline something Walter said earlier. A huge part of our problem

with Pakistan's problem has come out of Pakistan's failure to have an educational system. This is not beyond our ability to—I mean, when you put it in the context of the Iraq war, those costs of substituting a functioning public education system for the madrassas is trivial. But this is going to be a terribly tough problem for exactly the reasons that Bob just described, is the alternatives are not great.

I think we should have, 4 years ago, pushed Musharraf much harder in the direction of the reforms that he had promised, but it would have required a balancing against our anti-terror goals, which, of course, is what foreign policy is all about. But we don't have the luxury of not giving Pakistan whatever attention it demands because of its nuclear weapons.

Mr. ISAACSON. I come at this with a strange historical conflict of interest, which is—and I could embarrass Congressman Cooper if he were here. When we were in graduate school, the first politics I ever did was that I ran Benazir Bhutto's campaign for the head of the debating union at our graduate school, and Jim Cooper helped me.

I do think that Benazir Bhutto and others coming back as a democratic opposition, adds to the turmoil in Pakistan but is inevitably part of the process there, and probably a good part. I agree that General Musharraf's problem is not simply the embrace of the United States, because Mrs. Bhutto and others are not necessarily running on anti-American platforms, as far as I can tell, or trying to stoke up anti-American resentment.

If you look at Pakistan versus India, you see the model we are trying to create. When I was in India a couple of times ago, I was there for the election, and what happened was a Hindu prime minister was defeated by a Roman Catholic woman, Sonia Ghandi, who stepped aside for a Sikh prime minister, who was then sworn in by a Muslim president. That is a pretty awesome shining light of what we have to get to in terms of pluralism in this world if we are not going to have the type of threats that will face us over the next two generations.

And I guess I am being egotistical here, but I would second Jessica's seconding of what I said earlier, which is if we are not going to win the battle against the madrassa movement by competing with them in Pakistan, that is where we are surrendering this ball game.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, if I might for just a moment.

I just want to thank all of you for making those points, because I think so many times in our U.S. policy view, we are so narcissistic as to believe that all problems result from a relationship with our country, and that clearly, in this instance, there are other factors at play, ones that we need to pay attention to. So thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I just want to make mention with the great work of our staff here and a number of the members of this committee on both sides of the aisle, we were able to put a substantial amount of money into the budget this year and to enforce some education in Pakistan. The problem we are now going to have is making sure that is delivered in an effective way where it can be monitored and actually implemented without great waste or what-

ever. So we are moving in that direction. We still have some challenges on that, but it is a fight worth having, for sure.

Mr. ISAACSON, are you still squared away with us here for a while?

Mr. ISAACSON. I am actually hosting a lunch, which I wouldn't mind—a foreign policy lunch somewhere. So maybe 5 minutes, if I could; 10, 10. Fine, fine. Sorry.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. McCollum, you have 5 minutes, and then Mr. Shays has 5, because he is going to grill Mr. Isaacson.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Well, I appreciate your being able to stay, and I really found your July editorial in *The Washington Post*, where you argued that America needed a new creative solution to match the challenge of global terrorism very insightful. In the editorial you outline several strategies, including the creation of new public diplomacy organizations for the global age, and I strongly agree that we need an effective public diplomacy that is indispensable in America's toolbox in its fight against terrorism.

During the cold war—and the cold War has been discussed—the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe helped win the hearts and minds by giving invaluable information out to people regardless of their income and their occupation in those countries. U.S. policy was able to spread information about America, culture and values, which is democracy.

The current crisis in Burma, though, to me, is more than ever demonstrating that a proven low-cost strategy like Voice of America radio is still essential. The BBC reported in recent days that less than 1 percent of the Burmese people have access to the Internet, and the government has blocked Internet traffic into and out of the country. Radio Netherlands is reporting that Burmese stores are sold out of shortwave radios because people want news and information, and that is the only way they can receive it. Laura Bush and Chairman Lantos both recently broadcast to the Burmese people on Voice of America.

Now, I bring this up because I do agree with you we need to look at all the tools in the toolbox. Yet the Broadcasting Board of Governors, which oversees Voice of America with absolutely no transparency—no transparency—is rushing to close down radio transmitters all around the world, and I can supply you with the proof. You look shocked. I was shocked to find that out too. The BBG is silencing America's voice in a time when reaching the poor and oppressed populations in the world is even more important.

Now, I have introduced a bill to try to get the Board of Governors' attention, and it is H.R. 3598. We need to do exactly what you were suggesting, Mr. Isaacson, make big investments in new public diplomacy efforts. But I believe we must renew our commitment to Voice of America Radio and other proven cost-effective strategies. Voice of America is only \$10 million in a \$688 million budget. That is less than the inflationary increase of the GBG's administrative expenses in 2008, and they are cutting it.

I know you believe in using everything that is available out there and I want to make sure that we have your voice heard clear on Voice of America.

Mr. ISAACSON. Let me make it extremely clear. I love radio. I think it is an awesome and effective technology. I agree with Bob

to my left, that the dismantling of the U.S. Information Agency was a very bad problem; and that is another thing that perhaps you can look at. I think the BBG has not risen to the task in the past of winning the hearts and minds battles, but I absolutely—I am a believer in a lot of old technology, including even print, believe it or not, but radio will be, for the next 100 years, an incredibly effective way to communicate. So let's not disparage radio.

Mr. LIEBER. No, I strongly agree with your point about VOA. VOA, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the other radios are of immense importance. We ought not to be cutting services and broadcasts and budgets, but increasing them. They are an extremely important long-range investment.

One other point in passing, some disagreement with Jessica about China. China has played a very negative role in Burma, in Darfur, and some other third-world environments, sustaining repressive regimes for reasons that are, at times economic, at times political. We don't control the situation in Burma. China is a country with huge influence and, alas, it appears, to the extent we can tell, not to have used the leverage it might have to improved things, rather than allow them to get worse.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Isaacson, thank you for waiting up. I would love to ask why isn't there a public debate about the threat and what we should do about it? And whose responsibility is it? Is it Congress, is it the White House, is it just that the press isn't into it?

And then I am just going to say that it seemed to me, born in 1945, the 1950's were kind of like sorting it out. I mean, you know, I came from an area where everybody built these shelters that were really basements that nobody would want to be in unless they were crazy. So it seems to me that we didn't come to agreement on it until maybe when Kennedy tried to outmaneuver Nixon and be on the right side, so they were both in agreement, you know, we needed to confront and so on. So I would love to know that.

I would love to know if Sputnik wasn't—did we start out having to be an economic military effort against the Soviet Union expansion, and then did Sputnik add a third element, education, or was education and technology always a part of it?

And the last question is why are terrorists so unimaginable? And does that suggest that I fear them more than I should? In other words, I can tell you an umpteen number of ways to totally shut down this Government with very little amount of work, and yet they don't seem to figure it out.

Mr. ISAACSON. Well, let's not spread the word on the various ways.

I do think that the entire cold war period—in this room, for example, whether you are talking about the Democratic or Republican chairs of Armed Services and everything else—had a great consensus and discussion of the long-term threat, and that is something that is rarer today. And I don't think it really—you may be right, but in my reading of the history, having written about the Truman administration into the Eisenhower administration, I

think there was a serious understanding of how to deal or the need to deal with that threat.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, let me quickly ask you this. If we hadn't gone into Iraq, is that when we kind of got sidestepped?

Mr. ISAACSON. This is what I was going to say. The reason for—

Mr. SHAYS. I mean, in other words, with Republicans and Democrats working together.

Mr. ISAACSON. The polarization is what you are talking about, and the polarization is one reason we are not having a reasonable national debate, not just on the Hill. I left being in the media partly because I realized that our job in a new media age was to shout as much and be divisive enough as much as possible in order to get high ratings or readership. I think that the media has not played a unifying role nor a role of deepening some of these issues.

You referred to that, I think, in your opening statement, but, to me, there are many people to blame for the fact that a reasonable, intelligent, non-partisan—I don't just mean bipartisan, I mean rising above partisanship—debate has not occurred. I think that talk radio and cable TV, having been a member of that part of the media for a while, is not helpful in that regard. And even though I love the Internet, I think the Internet encourages divisive debate and shouting more than it encourages the formation of consensus.

So I think I will say we in the media or we in the recovering media—I am sort of a recovering journalist—are responsible. I think, you know, Congress, by the way it is set up, people playing to the base, districts that are more gerrymandering than they were when I was growing up, and you had a person who sat in that chair, Hale Boggs, who had to represent suburbs as well as inner city. That whole process has led to greater partisanship and less depth in the public debate, and I despair a bit, but I think there are many ways to overcome that.

Mr. SHAYS. That should be your next book.

Mr. ISAACSON. Thank you, sir. Well, with my Benjamin Franklin book, that was the point of the Benjamin Franklin book.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, but do a modern one.

Mr. Lieber.

Mr. LIEBER. If I may.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Isaacson, you can leave.

Mr. ISAACSON. I will hear what Bob has to say and then I will dash to my lunch.

Mr. LIEBER. America has always had a tradition of robust, and even bitter and sometimes unfair, debate, if you think about debates going back to the late 18th century. Also, let's not forget that during the early cold war, the architect of the institutions and policies, Dean Acheson, was denounced in 1952 by Richard Nixon, then running for vice president, who referred to Dean Acheson's College of Cowardly Communist Containment. There was plenty of Republican-Democratic animosity in the late 1940's and early 1950's. Reagan was often denounced from the left; Jimmy Carter was denounced from the right, and so on.

I do think, though, in response to your point, that the Iraq war has clearly, and I think dangerously, intensified the partisan anger and made it much harder to debate these things. I find that, since

I take part in a lot of debates, that all too often these very important and difficult issues are framed in ways that are outlandish and hyperbolic. So Iraq has worsened that situation, but we need to remember that America's freedom and traditions have always involved a good deal of cut and thrust, even when there was a rough consensus.

Ms. MATHEWS. I just would add that I think the degree of consensus in the cold war looks much bigger, in retrospect, than it was living through it. Much bigger. And while there is always value for another Walter Isaacson book, Bill Bradley has written, in his *New American Story*, of a lot of the issues that you and Walter just exchanged on, in particular, I think part of—and you know better than I how long it may take to change this, but the legacy of 20 years of redistricting is, at least on the Hill, has had a tremendous cost on our ability to act in a bipartisan way, because so few people represent really districts where they need to appeal to both sides.

Mr. SHAYS. Come to my district.

Ms. MATHEWS. But I also think Walter is right to draw attention to the effect of these new technologies in the communications world, because the smaller the niches, the less that you can reach across them, and people are living now in tinier and tinier niches, where they only reach stuff that they agree with, and this is a terrible cost for the country. So I think it is very important to focus on.

Mr. TIERNEY. The Internet was an example that I had such great hopes of the Internet broadening out the debate and balancing it out, and it went just the other way; it went just to the respective corner and read just the blogs or sites that they thought reinforced their view and intensified the action back and forth.

We obviously have to vote. Mr. Shays and I may be missing the first vote, but I want to ask one quick question of each of you. If you had to name one essential thing that this country should be doing differently than it currently is, what would that be?

Ms. MATHEWS. Addressing non-proliferation in the ways that I described here, no question.

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Lieber.

Mr. LIEBER. Taking profound steps about energy security in the way I referred to.

Mr. TIERNEY. I can't thank you both enough, and Mr. Isaacson as well. It has been a very informative hearing. I think that we have all benefited extraordinarily from it, and I hope that we get the chance to have each of you back again to followup on this and for other reasons. You do a great service to us in your respective roles, and I know you are appreciated by a great many people. So thank you very, very much.

Mr. LIEBER. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

